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Terrorist organizations require financial resources to fund their activities. Therefore, the 
struggle to stem the flow of terrorist financing is one of the most crucial aspects of an 
effective strategy to combat terrorism. This thesis aims to form an effective strategy to 
counter terrorist financing. To reach more accurate outcomes, this thesis focuses on a 
specific terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been a 
problem in Turkey for over 30 years. The study investigates the financial activities of the 
PKK and evaluates Turkey’s possible countermeasures against the PKK’s financing. 
Since a theoretical framework is important in creating an effective strategy, this study 
utilizes Michael Freeman’s theory of terrorist financing that examines terrorists’ interests 
in their selection of financial resources using six criteria. In accordance with Freeman’s 
theory, this study suggests that Turkey’s efforts to concentrate its financial 
countermeasures on the PKK’s most lucrative financial resource, drug trafficking, may 
bring more effective results. Nevertheless, Turkey should not ignore the PKK’s other 
types of financial resources because they also bring a substantial amount to the terrorist 
group. Turkey’s 30-year struggle against the PKK and experiences of other countries that 
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A. THE GOAL OF THE STUDY 
After the 9/11 attacks, studies of terrorism intensified and obtained more 
importance. Scholars in many different areas started to discuss the definition of terrorism, 
the level of threats, the areas of vulnerability to terrorism, and strategies for combating 
terrorism. Thus, they aimed to find an effective strategy to eliminate the terrorist threats 
by benefiting from past experiences. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find an optimal 
strategy for combating terrorism. The first reason for this difficulty is terrorists’ covert 
activities and their organizational structure. Their choice of rugged terrains and rural 
areas in which to take shelter makes it difficult for law enforcement and military officers 
to tackle them. As a result, terrorists operate in a way that prevents anyone from knowing 
about their attacks before they occur. Second, every terrorist group has various 
characteristics that are considerably different from other terrorist groups. The geography 
of their region, the historical background, popular support, and the goals of terrorists vary 
greatly among such groups. For this reason, one successful strategy of combating 
terrorism can surprisingly be ineffective against another terrorist organization. Third, an 
effective counterterrorism strategy includes various aspects like political, financial, 
social, and military sub-strategies. The success of the strategy requires the 
implementation of all these aspects efficiently at the same time. 
Considering the difficulty of finding an optimal strategy for combatting terrorism 
and to increase the effectiveness of the outcome of such a strategy, this study will 
examine a particular terrorist organization in terms of only one aspect of combating 
terrorism. Since this study assumes the financial aspect of combating terrorism as the 
primary instrument in countering terrorism, it will focus on the financial countermeasures 
against the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or the Turkish Workers’ Party (PKK), which is a 
notorious terrorist organization operating in Turkey and neighboring countries. The goal 
of this study is to explore effective countermeasures against PKK’s finances that will 
weaken the PKK and support other political, social, and military aspects of combating 
terrorism. Additionally, this thesis aims to contribute to studies of combating terrorism by 
 1 
forming an example for countering terrorist organizations similar to the PKK, such as 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia-FARC).  
Although this thesis focuses in particular on the PKK, it does refer to several 
terrorist organizations in brief, as alluded to previously. To improve the reader’s 
understanding of the study, Figure 1 provides a brief introduction to these terrorist 
groups, their age, geographical location, approximate number of attacks, approximate 
size, and status of activity. 
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Figure 1.  Periodic Table of Terrorist Groups Designated by the U.S. Department of State as of January 2014.1
1 “Periodic Table of Terrorist Groups,” Navanti, 2014, http://navantigroup.com/content/periodic-table-terrorist-organizations. 
3 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Terrorism has long been a threat to peace in the modern world. After the 9/11 
attacks, its danger became more evident because these attacks showed that terrorists have 
the capability to strike even a superpower. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States 
declared a “War on Terror,” which disturbed the terrorists’ safe havens and weakened 
them. Nevertheless, there is a debate among scholars as to whether or not the U.S. war on 
terror was successful. Some scholars contend that it failed because there is still a terrorist 
threat in the world even though terrorists have been weakened since then.2 In other 
words, the U.S. war on terror has not brought an end to terrorism yet. 
The U.S. war on terror has shown that it is hard to bring an end to terrorism 
because combating terrorism includes more than just a military response. Therefore, one 
can contend that the U.S. war on terror failed because it was mostly a military response. 
An effective method for combating terrorism requires not only a military approach but 
also strategic, political, social, and financial approaches. For this reason, this study will 
focus on financial countermeasures and try to integrate the findings into a strategy of 
combating the PKK’s terrorist activities. 
In the literature of terrorism, there are few resources that focus on terrorist 
financing because of the lack of evidence.3 Even though it is clear that terrorists raise 
funds, it is hard to obtain precise data about these efforts because terrorists carry out their 
financial activities in secrecy. Therefore, the studies related to terrorism financing are 
limited. Furthermore, while there are a few resources in English addressing the PKK 
terrorist organization, which has been an active terrorist group in the southeastern part of 
Turkey since 1978,4 there are quite a few resources in Turkish about the PKK. 
2 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 100–7. 
3 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,” in 
Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold 
A. Trinkunas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 16. 




                                                 
This study will focus on two neglected issues: terrorist financing and the PKK. It 
will analyze terrorist financing with a particular focus on the PKK terrorist organization 
and provide a reliable resource for the future studies that examine these issues. In this 
study, the PKK’s financial resources will be examined according to Michael Freeman’s 
theory of terrorist financing,5 which evaluates the financial resources from the terrorists’ 
points of view. With the help of Freeman’s theory, this study will evaluate the PKK’s 
financial resources and find the most lucrative and the most used resources of the PKK. 
The theory will also help to predict the PKK’s financial resources in the near future. 
Thus, with the benefit of Freeman’s theory, this study will be able to produce an effective 
strategy that focuses on the PKK’s vital financial resources. For this reason, after the 
completion of this study, its findings can also be used by other states that deal with 
similar terrorism threats. Additionally, this study will also encourage future studies on 
terrorism financing and guide them into a broader research. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Turkey has been dealing with the PKK terrorism since 1978.6 In the conflict, 
Turkey has taken political, economic, social, and military countermeasures against the 
PKK terrorist organization. Even though these measures were effective in weakening the 
PKK, they were not enough to bring an end to its terrorist activities. 
The PKK has been able to continue its violent acts for three decades because of its 
consistent and reliable financial resources. Even after the destructive impact of Turkey’s 
countermeasures, the PKK gathered its old strength several times over the 30 years of 
conflict and has continued to be a significant threat against Turkey’s political and 
territorial integrity. Its financial resources, including foreign aid, drug trafficking, 
smuggling, and extortion, have been the main reasons for how the PKK was able to 
sustain its terrorist activities and recruit more terrorists. 
5 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 34, no. 6 (2011): 463–5, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193. 
6 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 1. 
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The PKK’s operational area is the most important factor in its financial 
capabilities. PKK is active in the southeastern part of Turkey that includes borders with 
Iraq, Iran, and Syria, which are among the most unstable countries of the Middle East in 
recent years. This location helps the PKK terrorist organization get aid from other 
countries easily. Furthermore, the area also provides countless opportunities for terrorists 
to engage in various kinds of smuggling, extortion, and drug trafficking activities, which 
brings huge amounts of money to the PKK terrorist organization. Thus, terrorists can 
sustain their existence with the help of stable financial resources. 
I hypothesize that minimizing the PKK’s financial resources would make the 
terrorist organization less effective. I also hypothesize that taking effective 
countermeasures against the PKK’s finance could be part of an effective strategy of 
combating terrorism and support other political, social, and military measures to bring an 
end to PKK’s existence as a threat against Turkey’s national security. Thus, countering 
terrorist financing could be a part of a broader strategy for combating terrorism. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Many countries in the world have experienced combating terrorism; however, the 
success rates of these countries in combating terrorism are controversial. Since combating 
terrorism requires several dimensions, deficiency in one dimension prevents the success 
of any strategy. Financial struggle is one crucial aspect of combating terrorism. For this 
reason, this study will focus on countering terrorist financing with a case study 
approach.7 Thus, it will be more specific about its findings, which should increase the 
efficiency of the study.  
The case study of this thesis is the PKK terrorist organization. The thesis will try 
to produce an effective strategy for countering the PKK’s finances. In order to achieve 
this objective, this thesis will benefit from what other countries or organizations did to 
minimize the terrorist financing in the history of combating terrorism. I will evaluate the 
findings and examine their applicability to combating terrorism with the PKK, and also 
7 Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 50–5. 
 6 
                                                 
adapt the findings to Turkey’s combating terrorism against the PKK. After a brief 
evaluation of the findings of this study, the data would be applicable to other countries’ 
strategy of combating terrorism similarly. 
To conduct effective research, I will use various primary and secondary sources. 
Nevertheless, I will mainly use secondary sources, such as books, journal articles, 
newspapers, and online sources, such as the site of “International Center for Terrorism 
and Transnational Crime.” Furthermore, I will also use primary sources like government 
reports and sites, such as U.S. Department of State’s 2003 report Patterns of Global 
Terrorism and the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 
E. SCHOLARS’ VIEWS ON THE PKK AND ITS FINANCE 
Combating terrorism is a multidimensional process that includes social, political, 
military, and economic aspects. Countering terrorist financing is an essential part of 
combating terrorism because, as Michael Freeman points out, “Terrorism costs money.”8 
By focusing on a specific terrorist organization’s financing methods and examining the 
applied countermeasures in the world, one can find an effective strategy for countering 
terrorist financing, which can be also applied to other terrorist organizations after some 
evaluations and changes depending on the characteristics of a particular terrorist 
organization. 
According to Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism review, Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan (PKK) is an active terrorist organization in the southeastern and eastern parts 
of Turkey. It was founded by Abdullah Ocalan and his close friends in 1978 as a Marxist-
Leninist group. Afterward, its Marxist-Leninist ideology turned into an ethnic separatist 
ideology by adopting a political view of Kurdish nationalism and seeking an independent 
Kurdish state within the territories of Turkey. To achieve its objective, it resorted to 
violence and began its armed attacks in 1984 against security forces and civilians who did 
not support the PKK in the region.9 Since then, the PKK terrorist organization has 
become the number one threat to Turkey’s integrity. 
8 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 461. 
9 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 1. 
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Bekir Cakar, Mahmut Cengiz, and Fatih Tombul state that the PKK is the biggest 
threat to Turkey’s national security even though there have been many terrorist activities 
in Turkey since the late 1960s. The PKK is the biggest threat for Turkey because it has 
been responsible for 35,000 casualties, including both civilians and government officers 
in the region.10 For this reason, the PKK was designated as a terrorist organization by 
such countries as Turkey, the United States, Canada, Australia, Azerbaijan, and the 
United Kingdom, as well as the European Union (EU).11 Although the PKK has been 
recognized as a terrorist organization by these states and unions, some countries have 
supported the PKK heavily. These include Turkey’s neighbors: Iraq, Iran, and Syria.12 
Karen Kaya quotes Turkish commanders when explaining how the PKK has 
benefited from its geographical location substantially. The PKK is mostly active in 
Turkey’s southeast region where Turkey has borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. 
Therefore, the PKK has not had difficulties in finding safe places to hide and organize. 
Iraq, for example, has often provided safe havens for the PKK.13 The PKK has also 
benefited from the disorder after the U.S. invasion of Iraq by acquiring new camps in the 
Kandil Mountains, in the north of Iraq.14 Moreover, Iraq was not the only country in the 
region that supported the PKK. 
  
10 Bekir Cakar, Mahmut Cengiz, and Fatih Tombul, “The History of the PKK,” in The PKK: Financial 
Sources, Social and Political Dimensions, ed. Charles Strozier and James Frank (Saarbrücken, Germany: 
VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011), 4. 
11 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 2. 
12 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: 
Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 
(2007): 906, doi:10.1080/10576100701558620. 
13 Karen Kaya, “Turkish Commanders Discuss Counterterrorism Strategies and Lessons Learned from 
25 Years of Fighting the PKK,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012): 529–38, 
doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.661616. 
14 Gokhan Bacik and Bezen B. Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop 
a Political Solution,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 3 (2011): 261, 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.545938. 
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According to the U.S. Department of State’s report about global terrorism in 
2003, Iran provided sanctuaries as well as aid to the PKK.15 Gokhan Bacik and Bezen 
Balamir Coskun assert that Iranian officials overlooked the PKK terrorists and let them 
stay in the region. Bacik and Coskun also point out that Iran provided weapons to the 
PKK, trained the terrorists, and aided the PKK financially. In return for its help, Iran 
wanted intelligence from the PKK about Turkish and U.S. military bases in the region. 
Nevertheless, Iran was forced to abandon its policy because its aid to the PKK cost more 
than its gains. Moreover, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), PKK’s branch in 
Iran, has changed its policy and become a serious threat against Iran’s national security. 
Therefore, Iran agreed to cooperate with Turkey on the PKK issue and signed a security 
agreement with Turkey. Thus, Iran recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization in 
2004 and stopped its aid.16 After all this, one can argue that Turkey’s increasing trade 
relations and power in the region have supported its strategy of combating terrorism 
indirectly. 
Nur Bilge Criss points to Armenia as another country that has supported the PKK. 
Armenia provided sanctuaries for the PKK terrorists in Armenian-held Nagorno-
Karabagh and in Kurdish villages, which are close to the border of Turkey and Armenia. 
In addition, the border has become a point that many PKK terrorists use to infiltrate into 
Turkey. Furthermore, it is observed that many PKK terrorists are Syrian citizens with 
Armenian origins. Criss also states that after the violence of the Armenian terrorist 
organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), ended 
in the early 1990s, PKK terrorism started instantly. For this reason, she argues that this 
timing increased the suspicions of Armenia’s support and involvement in PKK 
terrorism.17 Even though Turkey and Armenia continue to work to improve their 
15 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (2003), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf, 126. 
16 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261–2. 
17 Nur B. Criss, “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 1 
(1995): 32, doi:10.1080/10576109508435965. 
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relations, Armenia’s support for terrorist organizations seems to be a critical obstacle for 
the future progress of the relations among these two countries.   
Daniel Byman, a professor of security studies at Georgetown University, also 
contends that Lebanon sheltered many PKK seniors.18 Moreover, not only have Turkey’s 
neighboring countries supported the PKK, but other countries have done so as well. In 
addition to the aforementioned countries, Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever state that 
Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Libya, the Soviet Union, and Cuba have aided the PKK 
terrorist organization logistically and morally at different times since 1984.19 Therefore, 
one can argue that the PKK is one terrorist group that has had an enormous amount of 
foreign help with less effort. 
Belgin San Akca depicts Syria as another neighbor that has supported the PKK by 
providing sanctuaries, training camps, and weapons because Syria disagreed with Turkey 
on the issue of sharing the water of the Euphrates River.20 In recent history, Syria has 
also supported other terrorist groups active against Turkey, such as ASALA and the 
Turkish radical left (Dev-Sol).21 Therefore, Turkey and Syria have had poor relations in 
the last decades even though they are neighboring states. 
Meliha Altunisik and Özlem Tur state that Syria’s offensive attitude, which 
entailed supporting the PKK and sheltering its leader, threatened Turkey. For this reason, 
these two countries almost engaged in battle in 1998. Nevertheless, Turkey’s deployment 
of 10,000 additional troops on the border forced Syria to change its politics. As a result of 
Turkey’s policy, Syria gave up its support for the PKK and signed the Adana Agreement 
with Turkey on October 20, 1998. After the agreement, Syria stopped providing weapons 
18 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 150. 
19 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: 
Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 
(2007): 906, doi:10.1080/10576100701558620. 
20 Belgin San Akca, “Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (2009): 589–90, doi:10.1080/01402390902987012. 
21 Meliha B. Altunisik and Özlem Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-
Turkish Relations,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006): 232, doi:10.1177/0967010606066172. 
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and safe havens to the PKK.22 Thus, Turkey weakened the PKK by preventing Syria’s 
sponsorship. 
Gokhan Bacik and Bezen Coskun point out the decrease in PKK’s active attacks 
between 1999 and 2002. After signing the Adana Agreement, Syria expelled Abdullah 
Ocalan, the leader of the PKK since its foundation, which later led to his being caught in 
Kenya. Imprisonment of Ocalan badly affected the PKK’s efficiency and strategy. It 
temporarily stopped its armed struggle in August of 1999. For this reason, the PKK was 
not active as much as in the previous years through 2002. Nevertheless, the PKK started 
to become more active in 2002 when its seniors understood that the terrorist organization 
was losing its popular support because of the Turkish government’s strategy to gain the 
support of the people in the region.23 Therefore, the PKK changed its name two times in 
2002 and 2003 to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people it represented. In 2002, it 
changed its name to Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and later in 
2003 to Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL).24 Even though the PKK 
changed its name to gain the sympathy of people, its strategy did not work because of its 
continuing violent attacks. 
Mustafa Cosar Unal, Chief Superintendent of the Turkish National Police and 
holder of a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the University of Maryland, contends that ending 
ethnic terrorism, such as PKK terrorism, requires more effort than other types of 
terrorism. For this reason, he states that Turkey must increase its political and social 
countermeasures as well as military ones. Moreover, he particularly focuses on popular 
support of the PKK. He sees the elimination of the PKK’s popular support as a key factor 
in combating PKK terrorism.25 Since the popular support is crucial for the PKK’s 
22 Altunisik and Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” 237–
8. 
23 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 251. 
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, official website, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa. 
25 Mustafa C. Unal, “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Popular Support: Counterterrorism 
Towards an Insurgency Nature,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012): 437–50, 
doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.661610. 
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finances as well, one can argue that the decrease in the PKK’s popular support would 
contribute to the minimization of PKK’s financial resources. 
Sever and Roth point out the PKK’s increasing involvement in illegal financial 
activities since the late 1990s. They assert that the PKK had to rely on transnational 
organized crime activities more because the states stopped supporting the PKK.26 These 
activities include “drug trade, extortion, illegal immigration, human smuggling, fake 
documents, money laundering, murder, violence, and threats.”27 Sever and Roth also 
state that the PKK traffics 80 percent of the drugs produced in the area of Iran, Pakistan, 
and Afghanistan to European countries via Turkey. Thus, the PKK obtains an income of 
50 million to 100 million U.S. dollars annually just from its drug trafficking. The annual 
reports of U.S. Department of State about global drug trafficking in 1996, 1998, and 2000 
point out that PKK’s drug trafficking activities are the primary source for its terrorist 
activities.28 Therefore, one can argue that minimization of PKK’s financial resources 
firstly requires the prevention of drug trafficking activities. 
Michael Freeman evaluates the terrorist financing according to his theory of 
terrorist financing.29 He contends that terrorists choose particular financial resources 
among others depending on their specific conditions, because not every financial resource 
is good for them. Terrorists want as much money as possible with as little effort as 
possible. For this reason, Freeman qualifies terrorists’ financial resources with his six 
criteria: quantity, legitimacy, security, reliability, control, and simplicity.30 These criteria 
affect terrorists’ choices for their financial resources.  
To briefly explain Freeman’s theory, terrorists want to obtain large amounts of 
money with simple, legitimate, secure, and reliable or consistent methods that do not 
control their strategy. Therefore, terrorists’ financial resources differ from one group to 
26 Murat Sever and Mitchel P. Roth, “Convergence of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of 
PKK,” in The PKK: Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions, ed. Charles Strozier and James 
Frank (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2011), 138. 
27 Ibid., 139. 
28 Ibid., 131–2. 
29 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–5. 
30 Ibid., 461–73. 
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another because of the different characteristics of terrorist groups and financial 
resources.31 Drug trafficking, for instance, seems more lucrative for the PKK terrorist 
organization because it is active in the region where Turkey has borders with Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria. Nevertheless, drug trafficking may not be as popular and lucrative a financial 
resource for other terrorist organizations as it is for the PKK.  
Kidnapping, extortion, and looting are more popular resources than drug 
trafficking for the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain.32 Freeman explains this 
difference with its two criteria: quantity and simplicity. Since the kidnapping and 
extortion activities bring more money and are less complicated than drug trafficking for 
the ETA, its resources are different from the PKK’s. Therefore, one can argue that 
financial measures against ETA’s drug trafficking will not hurt ETA as much as 
measures against its kidnapping and extortion activities. For this reason, countering 
terrorist financing must be focused on specific resources of terrorists to be more effective. 
Freeman’s theory determines these specific financial resources of the terrorists with its 
criteria. 
Habib Ozdemir and Ilker Pekgozlu contend that the PKK terrorist organization 
has six main financial resources: “international smuggling, extortion in Turkey and 
European countries, illegal trade revenues, mass media, business and cultural 
organizations, and lastly the United Nations’ Makhmour Refugee Camp.”33 Ozdemir and 
Pekgozlu’s analysis of the PKK’s financial resources seems to fit with Freeman’s theory 
and the significance of how the geographical location of the PKK makes these resources 
more profitable, more reliable, and simpler to obtain for the PKK.34 Ozdemir and 
Pekgozlu also argue that the PKK would not survive if it had financial resources only in 
31 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,”461-73. 
32 Mikel Buesa and Thomas Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An In-depth Analysis of the 
Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network and the Money It Handles,” Defense and Peace Economics 24, no. 4 
(2013): 323–5, doi:10.1080/10242694.2012.710812. 
33 Habib Ozdemir and İlker Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case 
Study: Financial Resources of the PKK,” International Journal of Security and Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2012): 
87. 
34 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–5. 
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Turkey.35 For this reason, it can be concluded that minimization of PKK’s international 
funding will heavily affect PKK’s financial resources. Nevertheless, the minimization of 
international funding seems to require international cooperation to be successful. 
According to Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism review, the PKK also has 
many financial activities in Europe. An investigation that was concluded in early 2011 in 
France shows that the PKK collected money from people two times each year in the 
name of donations. The investigation also reveals that one of PKK’s main legal resources 
was festivals and events, which were organized by PKK’s sympathizers in France. 
Another source of income for the PKK in France was the sale of its newspapers and 
magazines, which are propaganda materials for the PKK. Charity organizations in 
Germany, extortion activities in Italy, and donations in Denmark are PKK’s other 
financial resources in Europe.36 Nevertheless, these financial resources do not seem as 
lucrative as drug trafficking for the PKK. 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu point out PKK’s legal financial resources include mass 
media, business, and cultural organizations. Even though these organizations are legal, 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu contend that some of these legal organizations were founded with 
illegal money. They also assert that the PKK uses its media organizations, such as Roj 
TV, to spread its ideology. For this reason, Kurdish businessmen support PKK’s media 
organizations by advertising their products. Furthermore, the PKK terrorists sell their 
publications forcibly to Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian people who live in abroad. The 
prices of the publications are also interesting because there is not a fixed price. The price 
is proportional to people’s income; high income means high price. If people do not want 
to buy the publications, terrorists threaten to attack them.37 Therefore, people have to buy 
the PKK’s publications even if they are not supporters or the sympathizers of the terrorist 
group. 
35 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 96. 
36 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 26. 
37 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 93. 
 14 
                                                 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu also state that the PKK founded business, cultural, and 
humanitarian organizations in Europe with the early support of European countries. By 
benefiting from these organizations in Europe, the PKK conveys its ideology to broader 
areas. Moreover, the PKK also uses these organizations to cover its illegal activities, such 
as “money laundering, so-called taxation, and donations.”38 The PKK also organizes 
social events through these institutions and forces people to attend these events and 
donate to these institutions.39 Thus, legal organizations serve as sources of illegal 
finances for the PKK. 
Oldrich Bures points out the financial measures the United Nations and European 
Union have taken against terrorists. He states that after the adoption of the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution no. 1373, the United Nations obliged member 
states to “criminalize acts of financing international terrorism.”40 The resolution also 
mandated member states to “freeze the funds and assets of persons and groups engaged in 
terrorist activities.”41 In addition to these measures, the UN Security Council adopted 
three or more resolutions that require member states to put travel bans on people listed by 
the Sanctions Committee.42 With these resolutions, the United Nations has encouraged 
the international cooperation against the terrorist financing.  
The European Union also took several countermeasures with directives in 1991, 
2001, and 2005. The first two directives brought responsibilities to financial institutions 
about anti-money-laundering and required the formation of intelligence units in the 
member states to counter the terrorist financing. Moreover, the third directive obliged the 
members of the union to legislate the Forty Recommendations and seven Special 
Recommendations of Financial Action Task Force, which is an international organization 
38 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 95. 
39 Ibid., 94–5. 
40 Oldrich Bures, “EU’s Fight Against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and Unsuitable 





                                                 
founded in 1989 by G-7 countries to combat terrorist financing.43 Although the United 
Nations and European Union show great efforts for countering terrorist financing, their 
measures do not seem to be effective enough against terrorist financing because their 
resolutions are at a strategic level, and there is not an organization that inspects the 
member countries’ implementations. 
Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert state that the terrorists’ financial resources 
differ from one terrorist group to another. Therefore, they suggest various 
countermeasures against different terrorists.44 They also recommend the determination of 
real and trusted charity organizations by the government. Thus, contributors will know 
these organizations, and this measure will prevent unwitting donations to the terrorist 
organizations. Furthermore, the governments should inspect the international trade data 
carefully to find abnormal transactions, which are most probably related to financing 
terrorist or organized criminal groups. 45 Since terrorists’ financial activities are 
considerably connected with organized criminal groups, countering terrorist financing 
should also aim to prevent the financial activities of organized criminal groups. 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu suggest several countermeasures against PKK’s financing. 
They argue that border security systems should be improved. Since PKK’s main financial 
resources are drug, goods, and human trafficking, an advanced border security system 
would be effective against PKK’s financing. They also point out the importance of using 
a professional security organization to protect the borders. Their suggestion to increase 
the level of border security accords nicely with Freeman’s theory because the high level 
of security in borders will prevent the PKK’s main financial activities, such as drug 
trafficking and smuggling. Donations and so-called taxations are the PKK’s other critical 
financial resources, particularly in Europe. Ozdemir and Pekgozlu assert that 
international or bilateral cooperation is necessary to counter the PKK’s financial 
activities abroad. Thus, there would be more effective countermeasures against the 
43 Bures, “EU’s Fight Against Terrorist Finances,” 422. 
44 Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, “Conclusion: Taking Stock of Efforts to Counter the 
Financing of Terrorism and Recommendations for the Way Forward,” in Countering the Financing of 
Terrorism, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008), 297. 
45 Ibid., 299. 
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PKK’s finance in Europe by sharing intelligence with European countries and 
implementing more efficient sanctions.46 After the successful implementation of these 
measures, the PKK’s illegal resources would be minimized substantially. 
The PKK terrorism has been a real threat against Turkey’s national security and 
integrity since 1984. Even though Turkey’s strategy of combating terrorism weakened the 
PKK severely, the group has survived for 30 years. The main reason for its survival has 
been its consistent and reliable resources in Turkey and abroad. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the minimization of its financial resources would seriously weaken the 
PKK. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis begins with a brief background related to the PKK terrorist 
organization. In this first chapter, the objective, importance, problems and hypotheses, 
method analysis of the study, and literature review are presented.  
Chapter II reviews the need for a theory of a more effective approach to counter 
terrorist financing. Michael Freeman’s theory of terrorist financing47 is introduced in this 
part of the study. Afterwards, how the theory will help to develop an effective strategy of 
countering terrorist financing is discussed. The findings of this discussion are used in the 
following parts of the thesis.  
Chapter III discusses PKK’s activities to ensure its financial resources and the 
changes in its finance methods throughout the years. After the evaluation of PKK’s 
financial resources, the most significant financial resources of the PKK are determined 
according to Freeman’s theory.  
Chapter IV presents various countries’ tactics against terrorist financing in their 
countries, and discusses the effectiveness of these measures. Then, the possible 
countermeasures for PKK’s financing are stated by benefiting from other countries’ 
experiences and the findings of Freeman’s theory.  
46 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 97. 
47 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–5. 
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Chapter V includes the conclusion and the summary of the findings to ensure a 
broader comprehension of the study, and it also includes recommendations for future 
studies related to combating PKK terrorism. 
  
 18 
II. A THEORY OF TERRORIST FINANCING 
Obviously, terrorist groups need money to conduct their activities. They seek 
activities in their regions that will bring a great deal of money to them. Nevertheless, 
having a substantial amount of money is not necessarily the only benchmark for terrorists 
in choosing financial resources. Because every terrorist group has its own needs and 
expectations, it chooses financial resources accordingly. While FARC focuses on drug 
production and trafficking,48 Hezbollah receives a significant amount of state support 
from Iran and Syria.49 Additionally, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has 
mostly used its popular support and coercive fundraising methods to benefit from its 
diaspora around the world50 while the ETA has mostly resorted to extortion and 
kidnapping activities to raise money.51 Just as investors diversify their activities in the 
stock market, terrorist organizations also want to diversify their financial resources to 
eliminate a dependency on one specific kind of financial support. Economic dynamics, 
like the amount of profit, monetary needs, and expectations on returns determine types of 
resources. Because of this diversity in resources, studies of terrorist financing must be 
within a theoretical framework and have a strategic approach to reach practical results. 
Michael Freeman’s theory of terrorist financing categorizes financial resources of 
terrorist groups and asserts six criteria for terrorists’ selection of fundraising methods: 
quantity, legitimacy, security, reliability, control, and simplicity. Based on these criteria, 
it is understood that terrorist groups, like any other organization, want to maximize their 
profits. While Freeman starts his theory with quantity, he acknowledges it is not the only 
decisive factor. He argues that the other five criteria also matter in the selection.52 Thus, 
48 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 240, doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.651182. 
49 Doug Philippone, “Hezbollah: The Organization and its Finances,” in Financing Terrorism: Case 
Studies, ed. Michael Freeman (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012), 52–4. 
50 Christopher L. Corley, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” in Financing Terrorism: 
Case Studies, ed. Michael Freeman (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012), 117–8. 
51 Buesa and Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An in-depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s 
Economic Network and the Money It Handles,” 323–4. 
52 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–5. 
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his theory forms a framework for understanding the attraction of a group to particular 
money-raising methods and adequately explains dynamics of terrorist financing. This 
chapter will introduce Freeman’s theory, which includes six criteria for terrorists’ 
selection of their resources. Each criterion of the theory will be examined briefly. 
A. QUANTITY 
Obtaining resources that deliver as much money as possible is the primary desire 
of terrorist organizations. For this reason, resources that bring the most money are the 
most effective. Having a great deal of money ensures terrorists are able to continue their 
attacks, increase their capabilities, and recruit more people.53 This dynamic forms a 
cyclical gain; the more money they earn, the more lucrative resources they acquire, and 
the more successful they become. 
Because of their significant amount of profit, drug production and drug trafficking 
seem to be among the most popular fundraising methods for some terrorist organizations. 
FARC, for example, engages in all phases of the drug trade, from production to 
trafficking. Vera Eccarius-Kelly contends that to maximize its profit, FARC is a 
prominent cocaine manufacturer because it has involvement in at least half the world’s 
cocaine production.54 The drug trade represents half of FARC’s income, which was $600 
million annually at the end of the 1990s.55 This data shows the portion of FARC’s 
finances related to the drug trade at those times and gives hints about its current situation 
by reflecting its strategy. Therefore, one might argue that FARC chose the drug trade as 
its primary resource because it is considerably profitable for the organization. 
Kidnapping and extortion are another lucrative source of revenue for terrorist 
groups. ETA, for instance, has been a terrorist organization that sent extortion letters to 
millionaire businessmen and self-employed professionals to force them pay to avoid 
being a victim of the group’s future kidnappings. Moreover, terrorists kidnapped some of 
these people and requested a huge amount of money as ransom. Thus, ETA gained a 
53 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463. 
54 Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” 240. 
55 Ibid., 254. 
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significant amount of money in its 30 years of activity. Mikel Buesa and Thomas 
Baumert argue that the group acquired approximately 1.2 million Euros between 1978 
and 2010 through its kidnapping and extortion activities. Additionally, Buesa and 
Baumert demonstrate that two-thirds of this income comes from kidnappings while one-
third of it comes from extortion letters.56 Considering this high amount of income, it 
seems that high profits played an important role in ETA’s decision to choose kidnappings 
and extortion letters as its main fundraising method. Nevertheless, a large quantity of 
money alone may not be as crucial for other terrorist groups as it is in this example. 
B. LEGITIMACY 
While acquiring their financial resources, terrorists also care about the legitimacy 
of their activities. If they have illegitimate sources of revenue, which are disliked even by 
their supporters, terrorist groups can lose their popular support. As a result, their 
recruitment sources may also decrease. The disadvantages of having illegitimate 
resources may be worse if a terrorist group gets large amounts of financial aid from its 
diaspora or other supporting groups through donations and contributions. Thus, having a 
great deal of money would not help a terrorist organization survive or increase its 
strength. For this reason, this relationship is a trade-off, which requires a loss in the 
number of lucrative resources to gain and sustain high popular support and recruitment 
possibilities. Freeman argues that, as a result of this trade-off, some terrorist groups 
refrain from engaging in drug trafficking. Additionally, members of a terrorist 
organization can use fundraising methods to increase their personal wealth, which causes 
corruption within the terrorist group.57 These behaviors decrease the level of trust among 
the members of a terrorist organization and increase its illegitimacy, even in the eyes of 
its followers. Therefore, some terrorist groups have to renounce their high amount of 
profits to sustain their power and existence. 
56 Buesa and Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An in-depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s 
Economic Network and the Money It Handles,” 323–4. 
57 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463. 
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Since the legitimacy of how they acquire their resources is essential, some 
terrorist groups tend to keep themselves away from criminal activities; however, many 
cannot ignore the high profits of illegal activities.58 Consequently, many terrorist 
organizations, including FARC and the PKK, do engage in illegal activities like drug 
trafficking.59 Nevertheless, even though their involvement in drug trafficking is obvious, 
they conduct their business covertly60 to reduce an appearance of illegitimacy. 
Furthermore, terrorist organizations tend to engage in more legal activities and enjoy 
more popular support and state sponsorship due to these resources’ high level of 
legitimacy.61 Thus, they balance the legitimacy of their resources and the profits of 
illegal activities in this way. 
C. SECURITY 
Since terrorist groups are illegal and also illegitimate in their nature, they have to 
conduct their activities clandestinely to not get caught by law enforcement and military 
officials. Furthermore, states security forces are encouraged to infiltrate into terrorist 
organizations to gather intelligence about their activities. Some monetary resources, such 
as organized criminal activities, are easy ones to infiltrate for state agents. These factors 
make terrorist groups choose fundraising methods that are out of the state controlled area 
or that do not get much attention from state.62 As a result, terrorist organizations either 
need to stay away from illegal financial activities or conduct these activities secretly. 
  
58 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463. 
59 Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” 240; 
Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through 
Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 907–9. 
60 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Terrorism Financing 
and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 31. 
61 Elias Blum, Marten Lindberg, and Florian Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011: Eidgenössische 
Technische Hochschule Zürich., International Relations and Security Network,” 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/131592/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/2c8daf48-
349b-4261-a47a-bcad5e8085e5/en/OSINT_Q2-2011.pdf, 6. 
62 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–4. 
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In terms of the security criterion, state sponsorship, legal activities, and popular 
support seem more attractive than illegal activities to terrorist groups. Since state 
sponsorship is out of the target states’ control area, and target states cannot interfere in 
terrorist organizations’ legal activities and popular support, these resources are better for 
terrorists. Furthermore, in recent times, terrorists have started to use the internet and 
virtual economies more to eliminate target states’ possible interference during their 
transactions to transfer money. For this reason, the increase in use of the internet brings 
significant vulnerabilities to combating terrorism strategies.63 
D. RELIABILITY 
Terrorists prefer to have stable and dependable financial resources. They want a 
permanent flow of money to conduct activities at any time. For this reason, state 
sponsorship is not a reliable means for terrorists, because states can stop supporting 
terrorists or decrease their support any time. This happened in the period after the Cold 
War. Having consistent resources is connected to geographical and demographical 
elements. To engage in the drug trade and trafficking, a terrorist group must be active in 
areas that are suitable for drug production and close to borders and trafficking routes.64 
The geographical aspects of FARC and the PKK’s operational areas apply exactly to this 
description, which once again explains their high level of involvement in drug trafficking. 
Each of these terrorist organizations operates in an area that is considerably close to the 
borders, and they both are in the middle of drug trafficking routes. While the PKK 
conveys the drugs that come from the Golden Crescent countries of Asia, Iran, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan through Turkey to Europe, FARC is in the middle of the route 
that comes from Latin America to the United States.65 Consequently, the PKK and FARC 
have obtained great profits from their illegal drug trade activities for years. 
63 Blum, Lindberg and Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011” 3–4. 
64 Blum, Lindberg and Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011” 4; Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist 
Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464. 
65 Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” 239–42; 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial 
Resources of the PKK,” 89; Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money?,” 
89.  
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Demographics are also a matter in ensuring perpetual flow of money to terrorists 
because some terrorist organizations obtain a great deal of money from their diaspora by 
means of extortion, donations, and voluntary contributions. The PKK, for instance, 
benefits from its diaspora of 800,000 immigrants in Europe,66 in addition to its supporters 
in Turkey and neighboring countries.67 The LTTE is another terrorist organization that 
took advantage of its diaspora and local community. One-quarter of the Tamil 
population—including 800,000 to 1.6 million people—lives outside of Sri Lanka. In 
addition to the rest of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, LTTE utilized its diaspora 
around the world.68 Thus, it acquired reliable income from popular support for many 
years. 
E. CONTROL 
Terrorist groups want to preserve their sovereignty over their financial resources. 
If a state or private donor helps terrorists financially, they naturally may have influence 
on terrorist groups. Thus, states or individual donors can control and direct activities of 
terrorist groups for their own purposes, which may be significantly different from the 
terrorist organization’s goals.69 Additionally, these states or donors consider terrorist 
groups as a tool to use while achieving their own interests.70 This view means that they 
are not really supporters of terrorists. Since terrorists do not want to be beholden to these 
foreign powers, they are not very enthusiastic about state aid, even though states provide 
a considerable amount of money to them. Furthermore, state sponsors may want different 
terrorist groups in the same area to compete for state support. As a result, this 
66 Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis 45, no. 1 (2001): 55, doi:10.1016/S0030-
4387(00)00057-0. 
67 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 26; Ozdemir and 
Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial Resources of the 
PKK,” 95–6. 
68 Christopher L. Corley, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” in Financing Terrorism: 
Case Studies, ed. Michael Freeman (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012), 117. 
69 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464. 
70 Faruk Ekmekci, “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for 
Terrorism,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 54, no. 1 (2011): 125, doi:10.1590/S0034-
73292011000100008. 
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competition may turn into a political rivalry, which is not good for terrorists.71 In this 
situation, the lack of control over funds greatly damages terrorist organizations’ future 
plans. 
Terrorists also have other concerns related to the control of dynamics within their 
organization: they want centralized control over their financial resources to strengthen the 
central administration against the lower level units within the organization to avoid 
rivalry between them. Nevertheless, balance must be ensured between the control 
capabilities of high and low level units over financial assets to prevent the weakness of 
lower level units. Moreover, in terms of control, the timely procurement of resources is 
also important for terrorists to conduct their future activities without a hitch.72 As a result 
of these concerns related to control over financial resources, terrorist organizations are 
significantly wary when choosing their fundraising methods. 
F. SIMPLICITY 
Terrorists want to acquire money through easy, fast, and simple processes. 
Freeman describes these processes as “methods that require fewer skills, that require as 
little effort as possible, that have simpler processes, and that have fewer inherent 
costs.”73 Extortion activities, for example, are easier than cybercrime activities or 
organized crime activities that require technical expertise or international connections. 
Moreover, even if terrorist groups had the ability to engage in these more sophisticated 
activities, these types of financial resources are always more risky and uncontrollable. 
The simplicity criterion is valid for terrorist groups’ legal businesses, as well. If they 
want to raise money by founding companies and producing electronic items, they need to 
be as good as other firms to compete with them and also to sustain their businesses, 
which require much more specialized capabilities.74 For this reason, some terrorist 
71 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464. 
72 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464; Blum, Lindberg, and 
Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011” 464. 
73 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464. 
74 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464; Blum, Lindberg, and 
Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011” 4. 
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organizations tend to found media businesses like broadcasting companies, newspapers, 
and journals, which are easier and simpler to control.75 State sponsorship, in terms of the 
simplicity criterion, is also a good resource for terrorists because it does not require any 
effort, knowledge, or skill.76 Accordingly, if the only criterion were simplicity, state aid 
would be the perfect source of revenue for terrorists. However, if terrorists only sought 
out simplicity while choosing their monetary resources, they would be unlikely to find 
suitable sources of finance other than state support or private donor contributions. 
G. AN ADDITION TO THE THEORY: “VERSATILITY” 
Freeman’s theory consists of six criteria that explain the funding expectations of 
terrorist organizations considerably well. Nevertheless, the theory can be improved with 
different interpretations and additional criteria. Versatility, which refers to versatile gains 
from a single resource, would be the other criterion for the theory of terrorist financing.  
Versatility in this context refers to multidimensional outcomes of a particular 
resource. This is to say that terrorists do not focus solely on their income while choosing 
their fundraising methods. They also seek various other benefits that a financial activity 
can bring. Broadcasting companies, for example, provide not only a great deal of money, 
but also a great opportunity to spread good propaganda for terrorist organizations. Thus, 
terrorists also make propaganda for themselves while raising money for their activities at 
the same time. Human smuggling may be another versatile method for terrorists. The 
PKK, for instance, gains much from its smuggling activities. It acquires large amounts of 
money from human smuggling. In addition, it converts its victims by force, threatens its 
new recruits in Europe, and makes them the drug dealers in the streets. Moreover, it 
demands membership fees from these people, and creates a new type of fundraising 
method.77 Since terrorists get various benefits easily from these types of resources at the 
75 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 93–5. 
76 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 464. 
77 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 909–10. 
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same time, they tend to consider the versatility of their resources before making a 
selection. 
H. EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE THEORY 
Freeman’s theory is helpful in forming a framework for studying the popularity of 
various financial resources through the eyes of terrorists. It provides a strategic approach 
for explaining the reasons behind terrorists’ selection of their resources. Additionally, 
Freeman classifies terrorists’ financial resources into four categories to compare them in 
terms of his six criteria: state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular 
support. According to his theory, state sponsorship is a legitimate, simple, and secure 
resource that brings a great deal of money to terrorists. Nevertheless, it is out of a terrorist 
organization’s control, and there is a possibility that state sponsors can force a terrorist 
group to change its agenda and goals by holding power and influence with their support. 
For this reason, terrorist groups are largely not in favor of this financial resource. 
Illegal activities are reliable fundraising methods within the control of terrorist 
organizations, though their legitimacy can vary depending on a particular activity. Even 
though these resources are considerably lucrative, they are risky due to their insecure 
nature. Yet versatile benefits of some criminal activities are also a consideration to 
increase the overall profit. Furthermore, the simplicity of these activities varies according 
to the type. While extortion is a straightforward process, drug trafficking requires a 
strong organizational structure and international connections. 
Legal activities are legitimate, secure, and controllable monetary resources for 
terrorists, but they are low in quantity and reliability. Additionally, they require 
specialized skills and knowledge to engage in them. Nevertheless, versatile benefits of 
legal activities can bring more profit than expected to terrorists. 
Popular support is a legitimate, secure, reliable, and simple source of revenue; 
however, it is out of terrorist groups’ control and does not bring substantial amounts of 
money. It certainly supports other methods, but by itself it is not enough for the financing 
of terrorist groups. Accordingly, popular support is less preferable than other resources 
due to its low yield. Table 1 shows Freeman’s four types of resources and his six criteria 
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for terrorist financing. As explained in this section, it illustrates positive, negative, or 
mixed relationships between these resources and criteria to provide a broader 
understanding for the theory. 
Table 1.   Comparison of Terrorist Groups’ Financial Resources in Terms of 
Six Criteria.78  
 
  
78 Blum, Lindberg, and Schaurer, “OSINT Report 2/2011” 6. 








Quantity + +/- - - 
Legitimacy + +/- + + 
Security + - + + 
Reliability - + - + 
Control - + + - 
Simplicity + +/- - + 
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I. CONCLUSION 
Studies of terrorist financing require a strategic examination of the key factors and 
a systematic approach to elements of interest to produce reliable interpretation. Since 
Freeman’s theory provides an extensive guide for understanding the reasons behind 
terrorists’ selections of particular resources, his theory is a useful tool that meets these 
requirements. Furthermore, the findings of this theory can be used to make 
countermeasures against terrorist financing methods by focusing on specific types of 
fundraising.  
The theory is also interesting and instructive because it demonstrates well the 
trade-off relationships between the alternatives of fundraising methods in terms of the six 
criteria. Therefore, dependency on only a specific type of monetary fund seems to be 
destructive for terrorist groups while having various financial resources can eliminate the 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of other particular methods. 
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III. THE CHANGE IN FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE PKK 
The survival of a terrorist organization requires a struggle for finding adequate 
financial resources to continue its acts of violence. As Michael Freeman states, terrorist 
groups need money to conduct their activities like any other organization.79 If they do not 
have enough money, their violence is destined to come to an end. Martha Crenshaw 
points out the importance of sustaining activities for the terrorist groups: “[A]cts of 
terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival. … Survival is 
the minimal goal of any organization.”80 To achieve their minimum goal of survival, 
terrorists must have an organizational structure that supports financial stability. In terms 
of finance, sustaining a terrorist organization is more difficult than founding one, because 
an existing terrorist group has to meet the needs of its numerous members, such as 
shelter, food, clothing, medication, and weaponry.81 For this reason, terrorist 
organizations need to find lucrative, reliable, and consistent resources to continue their 
activities. Freeman’s typology classifies financial sources of terrorist groups into four 
categories: state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular support.82 The 
popularity of these types of resources varies from one group to another. 
The PKK is one of the bloodiest and most notorious terrorist groups that seeks 
financial resources to sustain its existence.83 To continue its activities, the PKK has 
benefited from all of the aforementioned categories of finance. When its state support 
decreased due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it changed its direction toward illegal 
activities to compensate for its loss. Thus, its adaptation to the changing environment in 
the Middle East has enabled it to obtain a wider variety of financial resources. For this 
79 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 461. 
80 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 29, 
no. 3 (1985): 473. 
81 Necati Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” [Financial Sources of Terrorist 
Organizations] Polis Dergisi [Police Review] 40 (2004): 28. 
82 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 465–71. 
83 Haydar Karaman, “Terrorism and Its Financial Sources,” Strategic Outlook, last modified May 29, 
2014, http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/Terrorism_and_Its_Financial_Sources.pdf, 9. 
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reason, it is obvious that the PKK’s change of its primary financial resources from state 
sponsorship to illegal activities has had a significant role in its survival.  
A. THE PKK’S SURVIVAL 
The PKK has survived for more than 30 years, despite changing conditions, due 
to its adaptability and its strong organizational structure. These two factors have brought 
tremendous benefits to the PKK by helping it recruit a multitude of individuals from the 
Middle East. As a result, it increased and also maintained its power, which has enabled it 
to resist Turkey’s effective countermeasures. Thus, despite Turkey’s large-scale military 
operations and its determined efforts to end terrorism, which effectively weakened the 
terrorist group in recent decades, the PKK has succeeded in surviving. 
The change in the PKK’s ideology helped it increase its operational capacity. The 
PKK terrorist organization was founded by Abdullah Ocalan and his friends in 1978, with 
a Marxist-Leninist ideology. When the Marxist-Leninist ideology started to lose its 
influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PKK adopted a nationalist ideology 
in the late 1980s.84 Eccarius-Kelly contends: “This ideological change significantly 
improved the PKK’s capacity to recruit young people in rural areas and expanded its 
logistical support networks into neighboring Iraq and Syria.”85 Thus, with the change of 
ideology, the PKK increased both its recruitment ability and operational area, which also 
supported its financial ability. 
Having a strong organizational structure is as important for the PKK as it is for 
other terrorist groups. Accordingly, David Tucker points out that subunits and networks 
within a terrorist organization, such as fund raisers, bomb makers, and weapon suppliers, 
increase its capacity to be more successful in its activities. The PKK has formed its 
structure this way throughout the years.86 Rex Hudson discusses the importance of 
having various people in the PKK’s organizational structure: “Large organizations, such 
84 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 1. 
85 Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” 237. 
86 David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong,” 
Calhoun: Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, last modified May 21, 2012, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/24971/101.pdf?sequence=1, 8. 
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as … the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have many members—for example, 
accountants, cooks, fund-raisers, logistics specialists, medical doctors, or recruiters—who 
may play only a passive support role.”87 Thus, having a strong organizational structure 
with various subunits has helped the PKK obtain financial resources easily and survive 
for 30 years. For this reason, Peter Waldmann argues, “[T]he longer a terrorist campaign 
lasts, the greater the danger becomes.”88 Due to its experience in the last two decades, the 
PKK has become stronger and more dangerous than it has ever been in its 30-year 
history. 
The PKK’s various recruiting methods also reflect its strong organizational 
structure. Waldmann states, “Members of [ethnic] terrorist groups are recruited mainly 
from the lower or the lower-middle class.”89 As an ethnic terrorist organization, this 
argument is valid for the PKK. Hudson contends that most of the PKK’s members are 
from the lower class.90 Hudson also states: “The PKK recruits its guerrillas forcibly and 
then subjects them to ‘brainwashing’ sessions at training camps in Lebanon.”91 Thus, the 
PKK recruits many people easily and indoctrinates them in its ideology in its training 
camps to increase their dependence on the terrorist group. Furthermore, Donatella Della 
Porta points out the value system that considers group members who are disloyal to the 
terrorist group as traitors and threatens them with punishment.92 Similarly, PKK terrorists 
threaten their reluctant members with death.93 In this way, the PKK prevents its 
87 Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and 
Why?,” Library of Congress, last modified May 30, 2014, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf, 12. 
88 Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” in 
Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. Donatella Della Porta, 
vol. 4, International Social Movement Research (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1992), 247. 
89 Ibid., 244. 
90 Hudson, “Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism,” 50. 
91 Ibid., 86. 
92 Donatella Della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political 
Organizations,” in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. 
Donatella Della Porta, vol. 4., International Social Movement Research (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI 
Press, 1992), 17–8. 
93 Süleyman Özeren et al., “Whom Do They Recruit? Profiling and Recruitment in the PKK/KCK,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 4 (2014): 339, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.879381. 
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unwilling members from leaving the group and forcefully makes them loyal to the 
organization. 
Family bonds are also important for PKK recruitment. Jerrold Post, Ehud 
Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny conclude from interviews with Middle Eastern terrorists that 
people who have family members in terrorist organizations are more likely to become 
terrorists in the future.94 The authors also state, “Families of terrorists who were 
wounded, killed or captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. And that 
strengthened popular support for the attacks.”95 The PKK coerces people into becoming 
members by kidnapping them. After a family member participates as a result of the 
kidnapping, families become more willing to support the organization by providing food, 
clothing, and shelter to the terrorists. Moreover, after the death of a family member, the 
PKK’s ability to recruit other members of the family increases.96 Thus, the PKK becomes 
able to recruit many people in the area close to its members. By recruiting these people, 
the PKK more easily controls and organizes its financial activities, especially through 
drug trafficking and the extortion. The ability of the PKK’s recruitment also increases its 
popular support in the region, which returns to the terrorist group as donations and 
political support. 
  
94 Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews 
with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): 172, 
doi:10.1080/09546550312331293007. 
95 Ibid., 177. 
96 Criss, “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey,” 20. 
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B. STATE SPONSORSHIP 
Due to the covert nature of state sponsorship, it is hard to obtain precise numbers 
of states supporting terrorist groups.97 The PKK, according to Roth and Sever, is one 
terrorist organization that enjoyed a great deal of state sponsorship until the beginning of 
the 2000s.98 Although Turkey’s neighbors, such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, have been the 
PKK’s main supporters by providing safe haven, finance, and weapons to the terrorist 
organization, the PKK has had sponsors throughout the world.99 Many countries, 
including the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria, Libya, Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia, 
supported the PKK at various times.100 Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, communist countries stopped supporting the terrorist groups. Additionally, other 
state sponsors, such as Iraq, Iran and Syria, decreased their support for the terrorist 
organizations due to Turkey’s increasing power and trade capacity in the region.101 
Therefore, the terrorist group realized that it could not rely solely on state sponsors to 
survive; it had to find independent and consistent financial resources.102 Furthermore, 
even though state sponsorship has always been an easy and lucrative financial source for 
terrorist groups like the PKK, there is a possibility of state sponsors restricting terrorist 
activities by forcing groups to act on state interests. Faruk Ekmekci explains the state 
view of terrorists very well: “It seems that for many states terror is nothing but war by 
other means. … [T]errorist organizations have provided many states a less costly 
alternative to direct confrontation with the enemy in both economic and political 
terms.”103 By using terrorist groups to do their bidding, states achieve their interests at a 
97 Ekmekci, “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for Terrorism,” 
128. 
98 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 906. 
99 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261. 
100 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 906. 
101 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261–2. 
102 Hudson, “Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism,” 339. 
103 Ekmekci, “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for Terrorism,” 
125. 
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fraction of the cost of a conventional war. For these reasons, terrorists have sought 
different financial resources to replace state sponsorship after the Cold War. 
The PKK has suffered the most from the decrease of state sponsorship since the 
Cold War period. Nevertheless, the PKK was luckier than other terrorist organizations 
because several countries, including Syria, Iran, and Iraq, have continued to support it.104 
Gokhan Bacik and Bezen Balamir Coskun point out the substantial state support of the 
PKK: “In terms of enjoying international opportunities, the PKK should be cited as an 
exceptional case that has been tolerated almost as a legal entity.”105 Adding to this, 
Ozdemir and Pekgozlu contend that the PKK would not have been able to survive that 
long if it had not had foreign support throughout its 30 years.106 The PKK has benefited 
from state support almost the entire time even though the support has decreased in recent 
years. 
Iraq, Iran, and Greece have all supported the PKK at various times. Iraq, for 
instance, has supported the PKK by providing the terrorist group safe haven in the 
country.107 Moreover, the PKK benefited from the turmoil caused by the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, increased its safe havens, and acquired new camps in the northern part of the 
country, specifically in the Kandil Mountains. Iran also provided safe haven to the PKK, 
and Iranian officials let PKK terrorists travel without restriction in the country. In return 
for its aid, Iran has requested intelligence about Turkish and U.S. military sites in the 
region.108  Similarly, Greece helped the PKK by providing logistical support and training 
for its members. The fact that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured at the Greek 
embassy in Kenya in possession of a Greek-Cypriot passport reveals Greece’s support of 
104 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 96. 
107 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (2003), 126. 
108 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261. 
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the PKK.109 Consequently, the PKK has not had difficulty finding safe haven and support 
in Turkey’s neighboring countries.   
Syria was a leading state sponsor of the PKK until 1998. The PKK’s one critical 
training camp, Mahzun Korkmaz Academy, was located in the Bekaa Valley between the 
borders of Syria and Lebanon. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, had lived in 
Syria and traveled in the country without any restriction until 1998. Additionally, as 
Necati Alkan contends, 90 percent of the PKK’s financial aid came from three countries: 
Russia, Greece, and Syria. Furthermore, Abdullah Ocalan states in an interview that of 
these three, the biggest supporter of the PKK is Syria since it is so hospitable to the 
terrorist organization. He also suggests many European countries are just as hospitable as 
Syria.110  
Syria’s support of the PKK evolved out of its several disputes with Turkey 
surrounding water resources and politics in the region. Faruk Ekmekci explains these 
major problems between Syria and Turkey: “Two major elements of the enmity between 
Syria and Turkey have been Syrian irredentist claims over Alexandretta (Hatay), which 
joined Turkey in 1939, and disputes over sharing the waters of the Euphrates River, in 
which Turkey is the upstream country.”111 The city of Hatay and the Euphrates River 
have always been an issue between Turkey and Syria throughout history. In addition to 
these disputes, a third problem is Turkey’s improving relationships with Israel, which is a 
great enemy of Arab states in the Middle East. Other than these disputes, there is no 
reason for Syria to support the PKK. Since the PKK is an ethnic terrorist organization 
that aims to build a Kurdish state in the region, and Syria also has a substantial Kurdish 
population within the country, Syria was not expected to support the PKK. Syria should 
consider the existence of a Kurdish terrorist organization as a threat against its territorial 
and demographic integrity. Nevertheless, Syria considered the PKK as an enemy of 
109 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 28–35; Karaman, “Terrorism and Its Financial 
Sources,” 11. 
110 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 28–35. 
111 Ekmekci, “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for Terrorism,” 
131. 
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Turkey rather than a threat to its own internal security. Aiding the PKK, which is an 
enemy of its enemy, seemed more profitable and logical to Syria.112 
Tension between Turkey and Syria has made Syria follow a more careful policy 
toward the PKK. After Turkey had warned Syria many times to stop its aid to the PKK, 
Turkey deployed an additional 10,000 troops to the Syrian border in 1998. Turkey’s 
military power in the region and its presence on the border has demonstrated its 
determination to prevent Syria’s support of the PKK. Therefore, Syria has stepped back 
due to the high cost of engaging in a war with Turkey, and the two countries signed the 
Adana Agreement on October 20, 1998. After this agreement, Syria expelled PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan, closed the PKK’s training camps, and stopped its logistical support of 
the PKK.113 The loss of Syria’s support and the imprisonment of Ocalan shortly 
thereafter adversely affected the PKK. As a result, as Gokhan Bacik and Bezen Coskun 
contend, the PKK’s activities declined between the years of 1999 and 2002.114 
Turkey’s increasing power and trade partnerships in the region dissuaded its 
neighbors from aiding the PKK. Iran, Iraq, and Russia, for example, have observed that 
their aid to the PKK adversely affects their trade volume with Turkey. The cost of the aid 
was more than its benefit to these countries. Moreover, the PJAK emerged as a threat to 
Iran around 2004. Therefore, these countries started to cooperate with Turkey against the 
PKK. Additionally, Iran has signed a security agreement with Turkey and declared the 
PKK as a terrorist organization.115 Thus, the PKK’s financial resources that are provided 
by its state sponsors have decreased substantially during 2004 through 2006. To be able 
to survive, the PKK had to find a way to compensate for this decrease in its financial 
resources. Consequently, it has resorted to illegal activities more to sustain its existence. 
112 Ekmekci, “Terrorism as War by Other Means: National Security and State Support for Terrorism,” 
131. 
113 Altunisik and Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” 
237–8. 
114 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 251; Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, “Conclusion: Taking Stock of Efforts to Counter 
the Financing of Terrorism and Recommendations for the Way Forward,” in Countering the Financing of 
Terrorism, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008). 
115 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261–2. 
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C. ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
The PKK’s geographical location is a critical factor in facilitating its involvement 
in illegal activities for several reasons. First, the PKK is active in the region where 
Turkey has borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Second, the southeastern part of Turkey is 
considerably mountainous, which decreases the ability of security forces’ to supervise the 
area. Third, the area of the PKK is close to the Golden Crescent countries of Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Pakistan, the biggest heroin producers in Asia. Last, Turkey is in the middle of 
the drug trafficking route, which starts in the Golden Crescent countries and ends in 
Europe.116 Therefore, engaging in illegal activities is an easy, independent, and lucrative 
way for the PKK to raise a substantial amount of funds. Roth and Sever contend, “The 
PKK’s annual income derived [solely] from criminal activities was estimated as 86 
million U.S. dollars at its peak in the 1990s.”117 Even though it is difficult to reach 
precise numbers about the PKK’s current income due to the covert nature of its 
activities,118 it is expected that its illegal income has substantially increased today. Drug 
trafficking, smuggling, and extortion are the primary resources for the PKK’s illegal 
income. 
Since drug trafficking is a considerably lucrative financial resource for terrorists, 
the PKK has involved itself in every phase of the drug trade.119 Roth and Sever 
demonstrate the profitability of drug trafficking: “[A] kilogram of heroin can be bought 
for between $1,000 and $2,000 in Thailand or Afghanistan. As it moves through the drug 
hierarchy to market, the value rises to $6,000–$8,000 in Turkey, before reaching 
116 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 88–9. 
117 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 906. 
118 Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” 31. 
119 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 89; Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal 
Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 908; Glenn E. Curtis and Tara 
Karacan, “The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized 
Crime Networks in Western Europe,” Library of Congress, last modified May 30, 2014, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf, 21. 
 39 
                                                 
Germany where it wholesales for $20,000–$80,000, with a street value of $200,000.”120 
Given the amount of money that the PKK can make, it has formed an organizational 
structure that increases its ability to engage in more drug trafficking activities. Thus, in 
addition to production, transportation, and trafficking of drugs, the PKK also raises funds 
by demanding commissions from drug smugglers in the region for protection.121 
In the PKK’s early drug trafficking days, its only income was the protection 
money it demanded from drug smugglers. When the PKK noticed that it could acquire 
even more money by involving itself more actively in the drug trade, it started producing, 
distributing, and transporting narcotics from the Golden Crescent countries to Europe. To 
become more effective, the PKK recruited people from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe 
who distributed drugs in the streets. Due to the vast number of these recruits, the PKK is 
more widely active in several European countries such as England, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and France.122 Haydar Karaman explains this change for the PKK:  
[I]n most cases, these groups [like the PKK] do not engage in drugs during 
the initial stage of their combat. However, due to an increasing number of 
cadres and operations, during the enlargement stage, this necessity 
compels them to get involved in drug trafficking. Their success in terms of 
enlargement is related to the funding demands of the organization.123 
Since the decline in state sponsorships at the beginning of the early 2000s, drug 
trafficking has become a remedy for the PKK’s loss in financial resources. 
Drug trafficking is the PKK’s most profitable and popular financial resource for 
several reasons. First, it is easy to transport and hide narcotics because they can be 
divided into tiny packages.124 It is difficult for law enforcement officers in Turkey, both 
gendarmerie and police officers, to find hidden narcotics without any intelligence or 
120 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 907. 
121 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 908; Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations 
Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial Resources of the PKK,” 89. 
122 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 90. 
123 Karaman, “Terrorism and Its Financial Sources,” 9. 
124 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 28–35. 
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notice from citizens. Since there are many methods and places to hide the narcotics, 
sometimes even trained dogs cannot find them. Second, drug trafficking brings a huge 
amount of money in a short time because the production of the drugs is easy, and there is 
a high demand for these drugs. Third, drug trafficking requires international links to 
become involved.125 This requirement is not a problem for the PKK because the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe helps it sell the goods. Michael Radu states that there are 800,000 
Kurdish immigrants in Europe, mainly in Germany,126 and some of these people help the 
PKK distribute and sell the drugs. For this reason, Roth and Sever state, “Germany’s 
chief prosecutor asserted that eighty percent of the drugs captured in Europe have been 
linked to the PKK.”127 This percentage shows how much the PKK is active in Europe. 
Lastly, the PKK uses the money acquired from the drug trade to purchase weapons.128 
The geographic location of the PKK also provides opportunities for human 
smuggling. To engage in these activities, the PKK has established a network with other 
criminal groups in other countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania, Hungary, and Italy. After establishing close connections with other 
criminal groups in the region, the PKK has been able to smuggle people from the Middle 
East and Asia to Europe.129 There are three frequently used routes used by the PKK for 
human smuggling: Istanbul to Milan, Istanbul to Bosnia to Milan, and Turkey to Tunisia 
to Malta to Italy.130 The PKK’s human smuggling activities have provided three main 
benefits for the terrorist group: a considerable amount of money, new recruitments in 
125 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 28–35. 
126 Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” 55. 
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Europe, and increased power in the region.131 Thus, human smuggling has been not only 
a type of financial resource for the PKK but also an avenue for recruitment and power. 
Human smuggling has been the next most lucrative financial resource for the 
PKK (after drug trafficking). Roth and Sever state that in mid-1990s, the PKK demanded 
between 2,000 and 3,000 Euros for the smuggling of each person. They also point out an 
Italian police report that reveals the PKK connections with the smuggling of 9,000 
Kurdish people from Anatolia to Europe in 2001. In another case in 2005, Romanian 
police revealed the PKK’s human smuggling branch in Romania. The police found fake 
passports and bank documents in the facility of human smugglers. Furthermore, the 
victims confirmed that the smugglers demanded 6,000 to 7,000 Euros from each person 
for smuggling to Berlin, Vienna, Paris, or London.132 In addition to its smuggling 
activities, the PKK also threatens other human smugglers to cooperate with the terrorist 
group and forces them to give a regular fee.133 Given the amount of these smuggled 
people and the money, one can argue that the PKK has a substantial income from the 
human smuggling. 
Another benefit of human smuggling activities is that they provide recruitment 
opportunities and help the PKK improve its influence in Europe. The PKK forcibly 
recruits immigrants, such as children, juveniles, peasants, and workers, to use them in its 
drug trafficking activities. The reports of 1993 in Germany show that there are 10- and 
14-year-old Kurdish children affiliated with the PKK’s drug trafficking activities in 
Europe. Moreover, in 1993, an 11-year-old child who was arrested in Hamburg confessed 
that he was smuggled into Germany and forced to sell drugs by the PKK. Since these 
children are too young to have criminal liability, the PKK uses them for its illegal 
131 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 91. 
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activities in Europe.134 Thus, in addition to financial gain of human smuggling, the PKK 
increases its power in Europe by controlling and recruiting these illegal immigrants. 
Another popular financial resource for the PKK is extortion in Europe and the 
Middle East. The PKK tries to hide its extortion income by calling the funds 
“revolutionary taxes” or “voluntary contributions.” The terrorist organization forces 
people through kidnapping to give money to the PKK. If people still resist giving money 
to the terrorists, they burn and destroy the properties and businesses of those people. In 
Northern London, for instance, many restaurants pay “insurance fees” to the PKK 
terrorists to prevent them from damaging the restaurants. The PKK also extorts the drug 
traffickers and smugglers. It forces them to give so-called taxes regularly for their 
activities. In addition, the PKK demands a “membership fee” from immigrants in 
European countries who work under a PKK front organization. Since the victims are 
afraid of the PKK’s further actions and threats, they are unwilling to complain about 
these extortion activities.135 As a result, this fear helps the PKK to sustain and hide these 
illegal activities. 
Extortion activities bring a great deal of money to the PKK. Roth and Sever state, 
“In 1993 alone the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds from Kurdish immigrants and 
businessmen within Great Britain.”136 If the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds even in 
1993, this amount must be incredibly large today. Roth and Sever also state that during 
Operation Sputnik, Belgian police learned that the PKK extorted almost 300,000 francs 
per month in Belgium. Similarly, in relation to Belgian operation, German police 
revealed that the PKK acquired almost 250 million deutsche marks per month from its 
extortion activities in Germany.137 Abdullah Ocalan also stated in 1999 that the PKK’s 
income from the extortion activities in European countries was 30 million deutsche 
marks. Nevertheless, since the European Union and the United States declared the PKK 
134 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 910. 
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as a terrorist organization, the PKK cannot extort Kurdish people with violence and 
threats as they have in the past. Even though it continues to collect a great deal of money 
from extortion, its income has declined in recent years. For this reason, it increased its 
legal activities in Europe.138 
Money laundering, counterfeiting, and smuggling in all its various forms bring 
significant income to the PKK. During Operation Sputnik, Scotland Yard and the Belgian 
Police discovered money laundering activities under Med TV, a PKK-affiliated 
broadcasting company. The police seized 350 million Belgium francs from Med TV after 
the operation. Even though this business shut down in 1999, the PKK founded another 
broadcasting company, Medya TV, the next year.139 Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan 
discuss the PKK’s money laundering activities: “Banks in Belgium, Cyprus, Jersey, and 
Switzerland provide privacy for PKK funds; monetary transactions are done through the 
hawala system or by cash couriers.”140 Of all these countries, Cyprus is especially known 
as the PKK’s money laundering center. Furthermore, the International Criminal Police 
Organization (Interpol) identified the PKK’s involvement in making counterfeit stamps 
and banknotes in mid-1990s. The terrorist group also engaged in cigarette and arms 
smuggling activities in the region.141 Blood smuggling is another illegal resource for the 
PKK. Roth and Sever contend that the PKK has collected 3,000 blood samples from 
Kurdish people under the so-called Kurdish Red Crescent organization. The terrorist 
group claims it collects blood from Kurdish people for charitable aims; nevertheless, the 
PKK smuggles the blood, sells it abroad, and profits from people’s kindness. Ultimately, 
138 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
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the PKK benefits from both selling the blood and having it analyzed in foreign 
laboratories.142 
D. SEMI-LEGAL ACTIVITIES 
The PKK conducts legal business in the form of legitimate media, trade, and 
cultural organizations in Europe. For example, Roj TV, the PKK’s leading broadcasting 
company, cooperated with the terrorist group to spread its propaganda. For this reason, 
Roj TV broadcast ideological programs for Kurdish people, and Kurdish businessmen 
supported the TV station by sponsoring commercials. Nevertheless, Ozdemir and 
Pekgozlu contend that even though Roj TV was considered a legal organization, the PKK 
founded it with illegal money obtained from drug trafficking. Therefore, some authorities 
can also evaluate Roj TV as an illegal business. In addition to its broadcasting company, 
the PKK has several publications in Europe and Turkey. The terrorists forcibly sell these 
publications, especially to the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The prices of these 
publications depend on the buyers’ level of income; the PKK charges people who make 
more money a higher price.143 
The PKK founded its trade and cultural organizations in Europe with the initial 
support of European countries. In addition to serving as financial and political bases, 
these organizations also spread the PKK’s ideology and cover its illegal activities, such as 
money laundering, false taxations, and forced donations. The PKK organizes social 
activities via these legal entities and forces Kurdish people to participate in these 
activities and to donate.144 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu discuss the findings of the German 
Ministry of Interior Report in 2006 and 2007, “[T]he PKK collected 1.4 million Euros as 
protection money from Kurdish people in the North Rhine-Westphalia state, 
142 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 912; Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and 
Typology,” 468. 
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Germany.”145 Consequently, these legal organizations are serving as illegal entities in 
practice by forcing people to donate. 
E. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The PKK wants to utilize the Kurdish diaspora’s loyalty in Europe, just as the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) exploited Irish Americans.146 For this reason, the PKK has 
charity organizations that collect donations from people in Europe, especially from the 
Kurdish diaspora. Kurdish Red Crescent, or the Heyva Sor a Kurdistane (HSK), is one of 
these charity organizations. Even though it operates in Germany, it has a website that 
allows it to collect donations worldwide. The PKK claims that HSK is a charity 
organization that collects donations and distributes them to poor Kurdish people. Yet, it is 
not a charity organization in reality, because it gives the money raised from donations to 
the PKK. Its commercials on Roj TV (currently called Stêrk TV) and advertisements in 
Free Policy Newspaper, or Ozgur Politika, reveal its connection and cooperation with the 
terrorist group.147 PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan stated that, in the early 1990s, the PKK 
collected two million deutsche marks as donations in only one campaign in Germany.148 
Due to the lack of public knowledge about the connection between the charity 
organizations and the PKK, the terrorists benefit from the goodwill of Kurdish people and 
make them support the terrorists even if they are not sympathizers of the PKK. Moreover, 
it is suspected that pro-PKK mayors support the PKK by benefiting from municipal funds 
and capabilities, which is another example of abuse of people’s goodwill.149  
Consequently, in addition to the lack of municipal services in particular cities due to this 
145 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
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Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial Resources of the 
PKK,” 95–6. 
148 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 28–35. 
149 Özgür Cebe, “PKK için Haraç Alan BDP’li Başkana Dava,” Sabah, July 8, 2013, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/07/08/pkk-icin-harac-alan-bdpli-baskana-dava. 
 46 
                                                 
abuse of power, people’s taxes are used instead to serve as another financial resource for 
the PKK.  
The PKK also exploits the religious responsibilities and activities of Kurdish 
people to increase its popular support and recruitment. Since most of the Kurdish people 
are Muslim, they have several responsibilities each a year, such as sadaqat alfitr and 
zakat, to give money to poor people. To collect this religious aid, the PKK established a 
religious organization, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, or Hereketa Islamiya 
Kurdistane (HIK), even though its Marxist and Leninist ideology contradicts religious 
beliefs. For this reason, there are few people who know about the connection of the HIK 
with the PKK, even including some members of the PKK.150 As a result, the PKK even 
takes advantage of the religious beliefs of people to raise funds. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Like any other organization, the PKK terrorist group needs to look for ways to 
survive and continue its activities. Therefore, it tries to maintain stable, lucrative, and 
simple financial resources to sustain its existence. Nevertheless, it was forced to change 
its financial resources, primarily from state sponsorships to illegal activities, due to 
changing regional and global conditions. The results of this mandatory alteration reflect 
the PKK’s strong organizational ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the world 
to survive just as humans do. Stanley Milgram explains the role of survival in human 
behavior:  
Behavior, like any other of man’s characteristics, has through successive 
generations been shaped by the requirements of survival. Behaviors that did not 
enhance the chances of survival were successively bred out of the organism 
because they led to the eventual extinction of the groups that displayed them.151 
Similar to this human behavior, the requirements of PKK’s survival shaped its 
financial resources. Since Turkey increased its power and trade relations in the region, 
and communist countries stopped supporting terrorist groups after the Cold War, state 
150 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 96. 
151 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1st Harper Perennial Modern 
Thought edition (New York: Harper Perennial/Modern Thought, 2009), 124. 
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sponsorship no longer provided enough financial support to the PKK. As a result of this 
decrease in state support, it started to engage in more illegal activities, such as drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and extortion. In addition to this change, the PKK also 
increased its legal activities and popular support to compensate for the decrease in state 
sponsorships in order to survive. Thus, the PKK found a way to support itself with 
independent, simple, and profitable financial resources. Yet its increasing illegal 
activities have also made the PKK a transnational criminal organization. As a result, its 




IV. COUNTERING THE PKK’S FINANCES 
A country’s fight against terrorist financing is the most essential part of 
combating terrorism because it prevents terrorists from surviving and sustaining their 
activities. Successful countermeasures against terrorist financing would accordingly 
support other political and military countermeasures. Because terrorist groups have 
various types of financial resources—drug trafficking, human smuggling, extortion, legal 
businesses, popular support, and state sponsorship—it is difficult to find a way to get at 
the core of their finances. Furthermore, every single terrorist organization has its own 
favorite financial resource. To produce effective results, countermeasures must address 
every terrorist organization separately and focus on a group’s particular financing 
methods. Additionally, effective strategies should concentrate efforts on the most 
lucrative and prevalent financing methods. Also, the past experiences and successful 
strategies of countries that have dealt with terrorism may help other countries disrupt 
terrorist funds. Turkey, for example, can significantly benefit from these experiences to 
increase the effectiveness of its countermeasures against the PKK’s financing methods. 
Some of the most prominent cases around the world have been Spain’s fight against 
ETA, Britain’s struggle with the IRA, Colombia’s experience with FARC, and the efforts 
of the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 
Drug trafficking is the most lucrative resource for the PKK. The geopolitical 
location of the terrorist group, which is very close to Turkey’s border with Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran, makes drug trafficking the most preferred method for the terrorist group. This is 
because Turkey is in the middle of the drug route that begins in the Golden Crescent 
countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, and continues to Europe.152 Furthermore, 
the PKK uses its gains from drug trafficking to create other sources of revenue like 
founding legal business organizations.153 Thus, drug trafficking increases the PKK’s 
152 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
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profit and secures the organization by offering another way of diversifying its fundraising 
methods. Therefore, the primary goal of countering the PKK’s financing methods must 
be the elimination of its drug trafficking activities. Yet this is not a matter that Turkey 
can handle by itself; Turkey needs the help of other countries in the region. To put an end 
to the PKK’s drug trafficking activities, Turkey needs to cooperate with Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. This cooperation would help Turkey develop more strategic approaches. 
Additionally, Turkey can benefit from the experiences of Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Colombia, the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan when dealing with the PKK’s 
fundraising methods. With international cooperation and insight from past experiences, 
Turkey can surely minimize or even terminate the PKK’s financial activities by taking 
effective countermeasures. 
A. SPAIN AND EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA (ETA) 
Spain had fought with ETA for more than 50 years until the permanent ceasefire 
in October 2011.154 Even though it tried hard to bring an end to ETA terrorism, Spain’s 
countermeasures started to produce effective results only when France gave up its support 
to ETA.155 Furthermore, Spain’s cooperation with France helped it counter ETA’s 
financing methods, which resulted in the arrests of many ETA terrorists in France who 
were involved with financing the terrorist group.156 The enactment of the law in 2003 
that aimed to prevent terrorists’ financial activities increased the capabilities and 
authorities of Spain’s law enforcement agencies. Roth and Sever explain the provisions 
of the 2003 law: 
This law gives Spanish law enforcement the power to: 1) block financial 
transactions and the movement of capital and assets; 2) prohibit the 
opening of accounts in financial institutions by anyone suspected of 
terrorists links; 3) confiscate any funds proven to have been the result of 
154 Buesa and Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An in-depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s 
Economic Network and the Money It Handles,” 318. 
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illegal activities; and 4) temporarily freeze any funds on the suspicion that 
they are proceeds from crime until it can be established otherwise.157 
Thus, this law gave more power to law enforcement officers in dealing with 
terrorist group assets, transactions, and illegal activities. Within the same year, Spain 
enacted a law to prevent money laundering as well. This law has required financial 
institutions to report their high-volume transactions. According to this law, institutions 
need to report their international transfers higher than 30,000 Euros and internal transfers 
higher than 80,500 Euros. Nevertheless, ETA has found ways to circumvent this system 
by making more transfers but in smaller amounts of money. To increase the effectiveness 
of its financial struggle, Spain also started providing specialized training for the 
prevention of money laundering to its officials and has increased its number of counter-
terrorism experts since 2008.158 After examining Spain’s countermeasures against 
terrorist financing, it seems international cooperation, especially with France, legal 
regulations, and increased authority of law enforcement officers have been the most 
effective. 
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE IRA 
Financial countermeasures of the United Kingdom (UK) are similar to those of 
Spain. The end of Libya’s support of the IRA in 1987 and the eventual decrease in 
support from the Irish diaspora in the United States aided the UK’s efforts to combat 
terrorism.159 The first noteworthy law in the UK to combat terrorist financing was the 
1973 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (1973 EPA). This act gave power to 
British police officers, or constables, to seize any suspected property that is connected 
with terrorists. The act also provided authority to judges to request forfeiture of the 
property of those who were convicted as members of terrorist groups in the country. The 
157 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “Cutting Off The Hand That Feeds It: Countering Terrorist-
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UK broadened the provisions of this act over time, which resulted in the first permanent 
counterterrorism law, the Terrorism Act 2000.160 Current regulations allow officials to 
freeze assets at the beginning of an investigation and any property of individuals overseas 
who are affiliated with terrorist groups. Thus, it prevents the use or movement of funds 
by criminals and terrorists during an investigation. Also, the UK formed a legal 
framework that enabled customs and revenue officers to share information with law 
enforcement officers.161 As a result, the cooperation and coordination between these two 
institutions increased the effectiveness of their work. In 2003, the UK enacted another 
law to help combat money laundering. This law required the citizens who deal with 
money or have financial affiliations to attend mandatory training and to obey procedures 
of identification, record keeping, and reporting.162 To describe the improvement of the 
UK’s fight against terrorist financing, Laura Donohue explains the UK’s effort to stop the 
IRA’s money flow: “[The government] started with the drug war and the expansion of 
asset forfeiture and money laundering regulations, which spilled over into the 
counterterrorism realm … [and] has moved from criminal law to civil law standards, with 
the forfeiture of property ultimately divorced from conviction on any underlying criminal 
offense.”163 Similar to Spain, the UK stopped state sponsorship, made laws to prevent the 
flow of funds to terrorists, restricted and controlled terrorists’ financial activities, and 
gave power to its law enforcement officers and judges to deal more effectively with 
terrorist financing methods. Additionally, both Spain and the United Kingdom’s 
membership to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body that 
determines the global standards to counterterrorist financing and offers regulations, 
increased their effectiveness in tackling with terrorist financing methods.164 
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C. COLOMBIA AND FARC 
Since the primary resource of FARC derives from its drug trafficking activities, 
Colombia’s countermeasures have focused on the prevention of FARC’s involvement in 
drug trade. The United States has supported Colombia heavily in its fight against 
terrorism because it has concerns about FARC’s drug smuggling activities to the United 
States. To receive early U.S. support, Colombia formed the Financial Analysis and 
Information Unit (UIAF) in 1999. This unit included experts on fighting against terrorist 
financing and organized criminal groups that engage in drug trafficking. The ability of 
this unit to access all the economic information within the country, from military data to 
private business information, has increased its power and effectiveness. In 2007, the 
government regulated the penal code to include and criminalize the financial activities of 
terrorists such as money laundering, drug production, and drug trafficking. This law gave 
UIAF the power to freeze suspected assets and transactions of terrorists. Additionally, it 
required banks to screen their customers before opening accounts and to report accounts 
of terrorists or newly designated terrorists to the UIAF. Thus, Colombia has increased the 
active participation of banks and financial institutions to impede the flow of money to 
terrorists. Furthermore, the Colombian government has tightened its oversight of charities 
and non-government organizations because some serve as financial resources for 
terrorists. In addition, the coordination between law enforcement agencies and the 
Colombian military has reduced kidnappings, which were also a significant resource for 
FARC. Moreover, Colombia has participated in many international agreements including 
the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, the Financial Task Force of South America against Money Laundering 
(GAFISUD), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Money Laundering Experts Working Group. As a 
result of this international cooperation, the United States included the names of FARC 
leaders on its list of persons under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. 
Consequently, this action prevented U.S. individuals and companies from engaging in 
business with terrorists and their supporters and blocked access to their property within 
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the United States.165 Thus, by participating in international agreements, Colombia 
increased its capabilities and experience in the fight against terrorist financing.  
D. THE U.S., PAKISTAN, AND AFGHANISTAN AGAINST THE 
TALIBAN AND AL-QAEDA 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has played an important role in the fight 
against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. To minimize the Taliban’s financial resources, the 
United States needed to stop Pakistan’s support of the Taliban. To ensure this purpose, 
the United States canceled all sanctions against Pakistan, eliminated its debt in the 
amount of 3 billion U.S. dollars, disbursed its loans, and offered an alliance to the 
country. Even though allegations of Pakistan’s covert and passive aid to the Taliban have 
persisted, the United States has continued to support Pakistan for its interests in the 
region.166 Furthermore, the United States and Pakistan have worked together to capture 
Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan. It follows that Pakistan’s detainment of hundreds of 
Al-Qaeda members, including several of its most senior militants, has strengthened its 
relationship with the United States. As a result, to reward its cooperation and alliance in 
the region, the United States did not include Pakistan on its list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.167 
Since the United States was exposed to a terrorist attack on its own soil in 2001, 
the government started to take serious countermeasures against terrorist financing 
methods. Accordingly, it issued Executive Order 13224, the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, and the Patriot Act to counter terrorist financing. These laws 
provided U.S. officials the power to block and freeze assets suspected to be connected to 
terrorists or their supporters. Additionally, the legislation prevented U.S. citizens from 
engaging in business with terrorists. Furthermore, the Patriot Act and the national money 
laundering strategy required tighter reporting procedures to prevent money laundering by 
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terrorist groups.168 Mark Basile suggests, “The 2002 National Money Laundering 
Strategy in particular made ‘effectiveness of efforts to combat terrorist financing’ and 
‘dismantling terrorist financial networks’ its top two goals.”169 Even though these 
regulations had critical impacts on terrorist groups, Basile contends that until 2004, U.S. 
laws have been successful only on U.S. soil. Since Al-Qaeda has already raised funds in 
different parts of the world, like North Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, Basile 
argues that U.S. regulations have been effective only to some extent.170 The terrorists’ 
quest for new ways to transfer currency, such as physically smuggling their money into 
and out of the United States to avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement,171 supports 
Basile’s argument that U.S. countermeasures have only limited effects. One might argue 
that it is difficult to succeed entirely in countering terrorist financing; states also need to 
look for loopholes in their strategies and update their countermeasures accordingly. 
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States brought to trial individuals who 
supported Al-Qaeda materially and froze the assets of terrorists and their financial 
supporters. A few years later, several countries, including the UK, the United Arab 
Emirates, and other Persian Gulf states, froze the assets of individuals affiliated with Al-
Qaeda. Moreover, international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Financial Action Task Force, contributed to efforts of countering 
Al-Qaeda’s financing methods with their oversight and reports. Thus, in addition to the 
U.S. GWOT, these countermeasures significantly weakened Al-Qaeda’s financial 
network.172 As a result, Al-Qaeda needed to request financial help from its affiliate 
groups. Greg Bruno suggests, “In July 2005, Al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, urged his Iraqi counterparts to send financial support because, as he put it, 
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‘many of the lines have been cut off.’”173 This statement proves that Al-Qaeda’s 
operational capabilities were significantly affected from the decrease in its financial 
resources and networks. 
Afghanistan has demonstrated critical efforts to counter terrorist financing. To 
deal with drug production and trafficking in the region, the Afghan government formed 
two units under the National Interdiction Unit (NIU): the Sensitive Investigative Unit 
(SIU), and the Technical Investigative Unit (TIU).174 The foundation of these units 
provided specialty and increased capabilities of the Afghan government to reduce drug 
trade within the country. The policy goal of Afghanistan’s national drug control strategy 
shows how it cares about the prevention of drug production and trafficking: “to secure a 
sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit 
drugs with a view to complete and sustainable elimination.”175 Consequently, Afghan 
officials aimed to eradicate and substitute the crops. The Afghan government achieved a 
substantial decrease in opium production by both persuading and oppressing the citizens. 
To reduce the production of opium, the government issued orders through its 
administrations and committees of elders (shuras) in the villages. The government also 
benefited from the fundamental principles of Islam that ban drug use by Muslims because 
it is detrimental to human health.176 Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that Afghan 
countermeasures achieved a significant decrease in opium production. Therefore, the 
Afghan government also sought to substitute opium production with wheat. The statistics 
in 2008 related to gross income from opium and wheat, in comparison to statistics of 
2007, show progress in favor of wheat production and prove the success of the Afghan 
government related to substitution of crops. To cripple the popular support of the Taliban, 
Afghanistan also has been increasing its humanitarian aid to her citizens, reconstructing 
peace and trust, ensuring security, and developing policies of improvement. The 
173 Greg Bruno, “Al-Qaeda’s Financial Pressures,” 5. 
174 Reese, “Financing the Taliban,” 107. 
175 William A. Byrd, “Responding to Afghanistan’s Opium Economy Challenge: Lessons And Policy 
Implications From A Development Perspective,” The World Bank, last modified March 1, 2008, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=469072
&menuPK=64216926&entityID=000158349_20080304082230, 16. 
176 Ibid., 17. 
 56 
                                                 
resolutions of the UN also contributed to the financial struggle against terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan because they aimed to freeze the property of terrorists and restricted the 
travel of designated persons.177 Since the main problem or terrorists’ primary source of 
financing in Afghanistan is drug trafficking, the Afghan government focused its 
countermeasures on this issue; however, it is obvious that Afghanistan cannot handle the 
drug problem by itself due to its weak institutions. 
Pakistan has also made efforts to combat terrorist financing in its region. It has 
been a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, which is similar to the 
Financial Action Task Force, but is a regional organization to combat terrorist financing. 
With the help of this international cooperation, Pakistan made laws to counter terrorist 
financing and increased its effectiveness by making specific regulations to identify and 
freeze terrorist assets. In spite of these efforts, Pakistan still has had some legal 
deficiencies related to its struggle against money laundering. For example, terrorist 
groups in Pakistan change their names frequently to avoid UN sanctions, which is a 
serious challenge for Pakistan’s efforts to counter terrorist financing methods. Due to 
corrupt officials, this situation brought out concerns about the implementation of UN 
resolutions. For this reason, the UN has encouraged Pakistan to update its proscribed 
organization list regularly.178 Furthermore, in June of 2014, Pakistan’s National 
Assembly approved the amendments of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2014.179 This law is 
expected to be considerably useful in countering terrorist financing activities because it 
aims to cut funds of terrorists through legal enforcement. 
  
177 Reese, “Financing the Taliban,” 107–9. 
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E. TURKEY’S POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE 
PKK’S FINANCING METHODS 
Turkey has been dealing with PKK terrorism for over 30 years. Even though 
Turkey almost brought an end to PKK terrorism several times, it could not succeed 
completely due to the PKK’s substantial support from its state sponsors. Nevertheless, the 
PKK’s state support decreased in recent years in comparison to what it received during 
the 1990s.180 This decrease weakened the PKK’s power while strengthening the impact 
of Turkey’s countermeasures on the terrorist group. Accordingly, it is obvious that 
Turkey’s possible efforts to counter the PKK’s financing—countering drug trafficking 
and human smuggling, stopping state and popular support, and closing the PKK’s so-
called legal businesses—would significantly help it achieve its goal of ending PKK 
terrorism. 
In the fight against terrorist financing methods, benefiting from past experiences 
of other countries is crucial for ensuring the effectiveness of countermeasures. The 
experiences of Spain, the United Kingdom, Colombia, the United States, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan demonstrate that countermeasures have become effective when they cut the 
state aid to terrorist groups. French assistance to the ETA, indirect American aid through 
the Irish diaspora to the IRA, and Pakistan’s support of the Taliban are just a few of the 
state sponsors that were stopped.181 Additionally, the experiences of the aforementioned 
countries demonstrate that their first and foremost action to counter terrorist financing 
methods was to build a strong and strict legal framework. The enacted laws gave power 
to authorities to freeze, block, and confiscate the assets of terrorists; they brought 
requirements to report high numbers of transactions and prevented citizens from 
engaging in business with terrorists or their supporters; they increased the power of 
judges and law enforcement officers and required government officials to be trained; and 
finally, they obliged financial institutions to verify their customers’ relationship to 
terrorist groups before providing service. Additionally, international cooperation and 
180 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 906. 
181 Alkan, “Terör Örgütlerinin Finans Kaynakları,” 10; Donohue, “Anti-Terrorist Finance in the 
United Kingdom and United States,” 323–4; Reese, “Financing the Taliban,” 107. 
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alliances have brought significant benefits to efforts to counter terrorist financing. 
Moreover, increasing the numbers of experts and ensuring coordination between the 
government agencies has strengthened the struggle against terrorist financing methods.182 
Since the PKK’s primary financial resource is drug trafficking, Turkey should 
first concentrate its counter-efforts on this method of financing to prevent or minimize 
it.183 Some scholars suggest cost-effective methods that require countering only a 
specific phase of terrorists’ drug trafficking activities; however, Turkey should adopt a 
comprehensive approach that addresses all phases.184 The cost of countermeasures 
should be of secondary importance to Turkey because the continuation of PKK terrorism 
costs more than the projected countermeasures, especially considering the lost lives of 
thousands of young people until now. Since the PKK terrorist organization engages in 
every phase of drug trafficking directly or indirectly,185 from cultivation and 
manufacturing to transport and sale, Turkey’s countermeasures should address every 
phase of drug trafficking activities separately. 
To produce better countermeasures against opium cultivation, Turkey should 
cooperate with Afghanistan because it is the center for the drug production. The lack of 
security and government control is the primary reason for widespread drug production in 
the country. The provinces that lack governmental control include Helmand, Zabul, 
Uruzgan, Kandahar, Farah, and some territories of Jalalabad and Kunar provinces. 186 To 
eliminate these opium-rich territories, Afghanistan needs to work with regional powers. 
Afghanistan and Turkey are almost sister countries; this decent and strong relationship 
182 Roth and Sever, “Cutting Off The Hand That Feeds It: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 21st 
Century,” 68–9; Donohue, “Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States,” 325–40; 
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Freeman (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2012), 210–5. 
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through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 908. 
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would ensure an effective cooperation and significant benefits to both countries. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to minimize the drug production in Afghanistan due to the 
value judgments of local people. As Feroz Hassan Khan explains, “Opium cultivation is a 
usual way of living for local people.”187 Because Afghans make money by cultivating 
opium, they do not consider the morality of their work. Therefore, Turkey should 
cooperate with Afghanistan in an outreach program to change people’s minds about 
opium production. Since the level of literacy is low in Afghanistan,188 television 
broadcasting may be a better tool than internet sources, books, and magazines to reach 
individuals. Moreover, Afghanistan should implement its legal countermeasures strictly 
to minimize the opium cultivation. Additionally, even though Afghanistan has attempted 
to substitute opium production with wheat, its efforts are not close to achieving its 
objective. To prevent opium production, Turkey should share its experience and data with 
Afghanistan to increase wheat production by lowering the profits of opium cultivation, 
providing subsidies, deploying agricultural engineers, and creating a more suitable 
environment for wheat production. 
Turkey’s involvement in eliminating drug manufacturing labs in Afghanistan can 
also significantly contribute to the process. Since Afghanistan is a safe haven for many 
drug labs, traffickers need to bring precursor chemicals to these labs in Afghanistan to 
manufacture drugs. For this reason, preventing these chemicals from reaching 
Afghanistan is as crucial as stopping the transportation of manufactured drugs. Yet there 
is no legal framework for controlling these precursor chemicals in most countries, 
including Afghanistan. Even though there is a UN convention that addresses precursor 
chemicals, this convention lacks requirements for countries to strictly control procedures 
of these substances. Afghanistan does not have an effective system of control for 
precursor chemicals, which provides traffickers an easy and secure transportation within 
187 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Politics and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 25, 2014).  
188 Byrd, Responding to Afghanistan’s Opium Economy Challenge: Lessons And Policy Implications 
From A Development Perspective, 21. 
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the country.189 To demonstrate the lack of control in Afghanistan, Mark Colhoun, 
technical advisor in the UN International Narcotics Control Board, reports, “From the 
cases we have seen, [precursor chemicals] are being smuggled [into Afghanistan] as well. 
Why they are smuggling them in is a mystery because they are not controlled, so they 
could just ship them over a border.”190 To eliminate this lack of control, Turkey should 
encourage and help Afghanistan enact laws to prevent the circulation of these substances 
within the country. In addition, even though Turkey contributes to the International 
Security Assistance Force in Kabul by deploying its military personnel, it can assign even 
more military and law enforcement personnel to Afghanistan to share its experience in 
controlling and preventing the transportation of chemicals. Furthermore, the need for 
traffickers to communicate with legal industries to obtain precursor chemicals causes 
vulnerabilities, which makes it possible for Afghan officials to gather intelligence.191 
Additionally, as a trusted ally of the United States, Turkey can request particular 
intelligence and Global Positioning System data from the United States to allow Afghan 
forces to conduct instant operations targeting drug fields and mobile labs.192 Thus, by 
causing substantial damage to drug production and manufacturing activities, Turkey and 
Afghanistan can prevent drug trafficking at the beginning of the process, and thereby 
Turkey also would prevent the PKK’s funding through drug trafficking at the same time. 
To forestall the PKK’s drug trafficking and human smuggling, Turkey also needs 
to improve the effectiveness of its border security system. Since some of the smuggling 
activities, human smuggling in particular, are conducted through the Mediterranean Sea, 
control of the sea by the Coast Guard Command is also crucial. Therefore, “border 
security system” in this chapter refers to both land and marine border security. Because 
the PKK terrorists use the same routes as smugglers and also dress similarly, it is difficult 
to differentiate between terrorists and smugglers. This challenge has exposed loopholes in 
the laws because the situations in which authorities of law enforcement and military 
189 Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Targeting Drug Lab Chemicals Is Key to Undermining Traffickers,” 
IHS Jane’s, 1–9. 
190 Ibid., 1. 
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officers can open fire against border violators are tricky. For example, security personnel 
cannot use arms against smugglers or terrorists unless they are shot at first. Nevertheless, 
smugglers and terrorists usually start the gunfire and injure, or even kill in some cases, 
security personnel in the first fire.193 To eliminate this problem, laws that are related to 
security, border, and use of force should be revised. Law enforcement and military 
officers cannot act as terrorists do since they are government officials. However, they can 
use their capabilities more actively with the help of the laws. For this reason, to improve 
the effectiveness of the border security system, security personnel should receive an 
increase in authority. Law enforcement and military officers should have the authority to 
fire first, under certain conditions, in accordance with fundamental human rights. To 
ensure this accordance, these conditions can include an absolute and critical distance of 
the borders, the existence of trusted intelligence data, the detection of people carrying 
certain kinds of weapons, and the use of thermal imaging cameras to detect the possibility 
of further threats. If these conditions are met, security personnel should have the 
authority to shoot first, but only in the context of a planned, gradual use of force. The 
gradual use of force should begin with a verbal warning, continue with firing warning 
shots into the air, and progress to shooting uncritical body parts. If these measures do not 
serve as a deterrent, security personnel should shoot to stop border violators. Although 
Turkish laws include this gradual use of force, their provisions should be improved to 
adapt these certain kinds of situations.194 Thus, the laws would explain the gradual use of 
force thoroughly and in depth, security personnel would be able to benefit from Turkey’s 
accumulated experience of 30 years of conflict with the PKK, and increasing security 
personnel’s authority would deter smuggling and trafficking activities. Additionally, the 
prevention of smuggling should be perceived as critical as the prevention of drug 
trafficking, because extorting smugglers is another of the PKK’s fundraising methods. 
Accordingly, considering the high number of smuggling rates in the southeastern and 
193 Anatolian Agency, “Şanlıurfa’da 1 Asker Şehit,” Ntvmsnbc, 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25527691/. 
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eastern regions of Turkey, decreasing smuggling activities would cause a significant 
reduction in PKK resources.  
The mountainous geography of the region around Turkey’s borders is a serious 
challenge for border security, especially at night. Terrorists and smugglers typically 
conduct their activities under the cover of darkness, which makes visual detection more 
difficult for border security. To eliminate this disadvantage, security officials should use 
a variety of current technological equipment, including thermal imaging cameras, night 
vision scopes and goggles, x-ray control devices, and mobile surveillance systems, such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Although Turkey uses UAVs in surveillance 
activities, it should increase the number of UAVs and their operators, thereby improving 
the UAV’s surveillance capabilities. Additionally, the extensive use of x-ray car scanners 
at every border gate, which can even scan big and long trucks, is essential; these 
machines are considerably useful in detecting prohibited items, and they save time. 
Shorter time spent processing vehicles is important in border security, as the border gates 
are always busy with the flow of people and goods. Conversely, longer times of control 
can affect trade negatively. Furthermore, trained dogs that search for narcotics would be 
useful. While trained dogs are significantly effective in finding narcotics, their abilities 
last for only a limited time, approximately 30 minutes. Therefore, increasing the number 
of these dogs at border gates could be even more helpful. Also, border security officials 
should have an extensive archive of statistics. With the help of this information, officials 
could pinpoint when the rates of capturing narcotics are high; they could identify border 
gates that detect specific types of prohibited items; and they could detect when 
population density increases at certain gates. This data could help improve the 
effectiveness of border security. 
To prevent the PKK’s drug trafficking activities, Turkey should also use the 
power of outreach. Drug trafficking ultimately causes harmful effects on human health. 
As a result, terrorist organizations that engage in drug trafficking, like the PKK, do not 
want the public, especially their supporters, to know about their involvement in the drug 
 63 
trade.195 Although the PKK’s involvement in drug trafficking is known to government 
officials, such as the military and police officers, the civilian population in Turkey does 
not know. To increase people’s awareness of the PKK’s criminal activities in the region, 
Turkey could apply the power of outreach through the media. Turkish authorities could 
provide documentaries and TV series that expose the PKK’s covert activities. Broadcast 
channels can allocate a significant amount of time to cover the PKK’s criminal activities. 
Many people in Turkey watch TV series and the news on a daily basis, so informing 
people through these broadcasts would be fast, easy, and effective. In addition, 
government officials and seniors can disclose the PKK’s involvement in illegal activities 
in their speeches. Increasing public awareness of the PKK’s connection to the drug trade 
would disadvantage the terrorist group; the PKK would lose credibility and legitimacy in 
the eyes of its supporters and sympathizers. Consequently, the PKK would lose popular 
support. 
Eliminating the PKK’s money laundering activities and limiting its financial 
transactions can have a profound impact on the group’s financing. After making 
inordinate amounts of money from its illegal fundraising methods, the PKK needs to 
engage in money laundering activities to convert its funds into “legitimate” resources. To 
prevent the PKK’s money laundering activities, Turkey should have strict laws against 
money laundering, such as they have in Spain, the UK, Colombia, and the United States. 
Accordingly, Turkey should revise its current money laundering laws to improve law 
enforcement’s ability to freeze, block, and confiscate the assets of suspected or known 
terrorists. Turkey should require the reporting and recording of high transaction amounts 
to prevent citizens from doing business with terrorists or their supporters. This reporting 
would increase scrutiny of existing terrorist bank accounts as well. Writing these laws is 
not enough; the laws must then be put into practice. Although it is known that money 
laundering activities exist in Turkey, the absence of prosecutions and convictions related 
to money laundering crimes until recently is an indicator of Turkey’s failure in 
195 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463. 
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countering money laundering.196 Additionally, Turkey should coordinate the 
implementations of anti-money-laundering laws among its institutions to ensure 
effectiveness of the financial countermeasures. Furthermore, as a member of the FATF, 
Turkey should increase its international cooperation and also improve its current ranking 
in the FATF’s list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions, which includes Turkey 
under the category of Improving Global Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Terrorist 
Financing Compliance.197 Turkey’s further countermeasures would serve both to increase 
its ranking, change its category in FATF’s list, and counter the PKK’s financing. Also, 
Turkey’s efforts to follow Spain and Colombia’s lead in increasing its number of 
counterterrorism experts would contribute to the success of anti-money-laundering 
activities. For this reason, Turkey should improve national security and counterterrorism 
departments in its universities, and enhance the number of these departments nationwide. 
The experiences of the aforementioned countries prove that the prevention of state 
sponsorships is pivotal in ensuring countermeasure effectiveness. Turkey should give 
high priority to stopping the PKK’s state aid; the decrease in state support in the late 
1990s and early 2000s resulted in a reduction in the PKK’s powers, and therefore, a 
subsequent reduction in the number of terrorist attacks.198 Although Turkey has reduced 
the amount of aid given to the PKK by Russia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran due to its increasing 
political power and trade volume in the region, the PKK has continued to enjoy state 
aid.199 The PKK’s camps in Iraq and Syria prove that these countries are safe havens. To 
eliminate state aid, Turkey can implement sanctions against the state sponsors of the PKK 
by benefiting from its political and economic power in the region. Additionally, in spite 
of state sponsorship’s covert nature, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency should 
identify the countries that support the PKK directly or indirectly, and Turkey should 
196 U.S. Department of State, “2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),” 
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follow a zero-tolerance policy against state aid. Furthermore, Turkey should be careful 
about the role that was given to the PKK by Western countries to combat the extremist 
groups in the Middle East because this role can provide new types of financial resources 
to the PKK.200 
Because the PKK uses its drug trafficking money to create so-called legal 
businesses and charity organizations, Turkey should also take precautions against the 
PKK’s popular support by these so-called legal organizations. HSK, for example, is a 
Kurdish Red Crescent organization that collects donations from people in Europe. 
Needless to say, it does not use the collected money to help poor and needy Kurdish 
people. Instead, it delivers the money directly to the PKK terrorists and its supporters. 
Additionally, it supports the PKK’s media campaign by giving advertisements and 
commercials to the PKK’s magazines and broadcast channels. Because Kurdish people 
are not aware of this illicit connection to the PKK, they make donations to the HSK, and 
end up supporting the PKK indirectly.201 If they knew about the relationship between the 
two organizations, they probably would not give donations to HSK. To prevent this 
inadvertent aid, Turkey should increase people’s awareness about the connections 
between these types of organizations and the PKK. Furthermore, to make people aware of 
this relationship, Turkey should use a media outlet that broadcasts in Turkish, Kurdish, 
and English. The Turkish authorities should encourage broadcasters to promote special 
programs regarding the PKK’s so-called charity and business organizations. Moreover, 
magazines, newspapers, and journals should be encouraged to talk about the PKK’s 
relationship with these organizations. By ensuring that people know about the PKK’s 
affiliation, Turkey can prevent Kurdish people from unknowingly helping the PKK. Also, 
although these so-called legal organizations have been operating in Europe, European 
countries are not responding adequately. Despite the EU’s recognition of PKK as a 
200 Reuters, “America’s Ally Against Islamic State: A Terrorist Group,” Newsweek, August 21, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/americas-ally-against-islamic-state-terrorist-group-266122. 
201 Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: 
Financial Resources of the PKK,” 93–6. 
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terrorist organization since the beginning of the 2000s,202 PKK-affiliated organizations 
and companies have been continuing to operate in Europe. To prevent the PKK’s illegal 
activities in Europe, Turkey should inform European countries about HSK’s and other 
organizations’ relationship with the PKK, by providing documents and intelligence data, 
and increasing its partnership and cooperation with European countries. As a result, 
Turkey should appeal to the EU to conduct more strict oversight of the PKK’s related 
organizations and to close these organizations due to their illegal affiliation with the 
terrorist group. In addition, Turkey should have effective financial oversight of the 
municipal expenditures of its city mayors, as pro-PKK mayors are suspected of abusing 
their authorities to provide funds to the PKK.203 
F. CONCLUSION 
Countering terrorist financing is the most essential part of combating terrorism 
because it destroys the determination of terrorist groups to continue their activities. 
Additionally, financial countermeasures assist and increase the effectiveness of political 
and military campaigns. To conduct successful financial countermeasures against terrorist 
financing, countries and international organizations should focus on the most lucrative 
resources of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, learning from the successful anti-
terrorist experiences of other countries, like Spain, Colombia, the UK, and the United 
States, could provide helpful information toward minimizing terrorists’ financial gains. 
Because the PKK has been acquiring a substantial amount of money from drug 
trafficking activities, Turkey should concentrate its anti-terrorist financing efforts on the 
PKK’s drug trafficking and drug production. Moreover, Turkey should focus on 
minimizing the PKK’s smuggling and extortion activities, eliminating its state and 
popular support, and closing its so-called legal businesses. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Terrorist organizations need money to continue their activities. Therefore, 
disrupting their financing methods is a vital element of an effective anti-terrorism 
strategy. Successful disruption of terrorist financing methods would also increase the 
effectiveness of other aspects of combating terrorism, such as political, financial, social, 
and military countermeasures. Consequently, this study focused on the financial aspect of 
combating terrorism by examining a terrorist group, the PKK, to reach more specific 
conclusions. Nevertheless, even though the struggle against terrorist financing methods 
has a crucial role in combating terrorism, by itself it is not enough to end terrorism. States 
should also implement political, social, and military countermeasures. 
To counter terrorist financing methods effectively, states should follow a strategic 
framework built on a theoretical and scientific foundation. Freeman’s theory of terrorist 
financing methods explains the financial needs of terrorists by presenting six criteria that 
affect terrorists’ decisions to select specific types of financial resources. Even though the 
financial resources that bring in high amounts of money are most preferred by terrorists, 
they also seek resources that bring constant, secure, controllable, reliable, and easy gains. 
Geographical location and political conditions also matter in the selection of resources.204 
Additionally, terrorists choose resources that bring versatile gains at once. A single 
resource that brings both money and recruitment opportunities to the group provides 
versatile outcomes. Even though it is difficult to obtain current data regarding terrorist 
activities of financing due to the covert nature of terrorism,205 Freeman’s theory 
compensates for this difficulty. The evaluation of Freeman’s six criteria gives opportunity 
to determine terrorists’ tendency toward specific kinds of financial resources. Thus, the 
theory helps countries focus on a strategic path. Nevertheless, to reach accurate results, 
this evaluation should be tailored to specific terrorist organizations because they differ in 
their tactics, ideologies, and survival methods.  
204 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 463–5. 
205 Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” 31. 
 69 
                                                 
The PKK terrorist organization has been a significant problem for Turkey over the 
past 30 years. Even though Turkey weakened the PKK substantially with military 
operations in early 1990s and 2000s, the PKK survived due to its considerable state 
support from other countries.206 During the three-decade conflict, the PKK’s activities 
resulted in death of 35,000, including both civilian and military personnel in the 
region.207 Despite the success of Turkey’s military efforts against the PKK, Turkey could 
not coordinate its military success with its political and financial countermeasures. 
Therefore, the PKK has survived for a long time. 
When the Cold War ended, and Turkey increased its power in the region, state 
sponsorship of the PKK started to decrease, which caused the terrorist group to suffer 
notably from the lack of state support. To compensate, the PKK increased its illegal 
financial activities in the region. Beginning in the 1990s, the PKK engaged more in drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and extortion. Its geographical location, which is at the 
border of Turkey with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, paved the way for the PKK’s involvement in 
these activities. In particular, drug trafficking has been the most lucrative and most 
popular resource of the PKK.208 Additionally, the PKK used the money it obtained from 
illegal activities to found so-called legal businesses in Europe.209 Thus, its illegal 
activities have brought versatile gains to the terrorist group. Moreover, the PKK has 
enjoyed significant popular support with the help of its charity organizations. But the 
charitable component is just a front; in reality, these organizations transfer their collected 
donations directly to the PKK.210 Thus, the PKK exploits the goodness of donors, while 
it continues to carry out illegal activities behind their seemingly legal appearances. 
Furthermore, even though the PKK’s current state support from other countries has 
decreased in comparison to previous years, it has continued to enjoy certain types of state 
206 Bacik and Coskun, “The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey’s Failure to Develop a Political 
Solution,” 261–2. 
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support, at least for sheltering its members in neighboring countries. Thus, by 
diversifying its financial resources, the PKK has maintained its power. 
To counter the PKK’s financial resources, the first and foremost goal of Turkey 
should be to adopt a broad strategy. Turkey should benefit from the experiences of other 
countries that have fought against terrorism, like Spain, the UK, Colombia, and the 
United States. These experiences demonstrate that all of these countries not only have 
formed a robust legal framework to counter terrorist financing, but they also implemented 
related regulations. Moreover, their experiences show that the financial countermeasures 
of these countries started to work when they stopped state support to terrorist 
organizations. Turkey should follow this example and revise its current regulations, 
enacting new and detailed laws to prevent the PKK’s financial activities. Then, Turkey 
should aim to disrupt terrorists’ drug trafficking because it is the most lucrative resource 
of the PKK. To eliminate drug trafficking, Turkey should target every phase, from 
cultivation and manufacturing to trafficking and selling. To achieve this objective, it 
should form partnerships to ensure regional and international cooperation. Additionally, 
to prevent the PKK’s drug trafficking and also human smuggling, Turkey should improve 
the effectiveness of its border security by employing more advanced technology, 
increasing the authority of its government officers, and enacting laws. Furthermore, 
Turkey should prevent state support of the PKK from other countries because past 
experiences indicate that the PKK was able to survive due to this resource. The 
increasing political and economic power of Turkey and its trade volume in the region 
would contribute to its counterterrorism measures by allowing it to cut the PKK’s 
financial resources, such as state aid. Moreover, to decrease the popular support of the 
PKK, Turkey should use the power of media to inform the public on two fronts: to show 
the involvement of the PKK in the drug trade and drug trafficking and to reveal the illicit 
relationships between quasi-legal businesses and charity organizations, and the terrorist 
group. Because many people are unaware of the PKK’s connection with illegal activities 
and its charity organizations, information efforts by Turkey would substantially 
undermine the legitimacy of the PKK in the eyes of its supporters. Since the PKK has a 
 71 
significant population and also many quasi-legal organizations in Europe,211 the PKK’s 
existence may be a threat for European countries as well. Therefore, Turkey should 
convince European countries to cooperate against the PKK’s existence in Europe.  
In conclusion, the struggle against terrorist financing methods is vital to 
combating terrorism. By adopting this argument as a focal point, this study examined 
Turkey’s possible financial countermeasures against the PKK terrorist organization. 
Consequently, this study suggests that even though countering terrorist financing 
methods may not end PKK terrorism in Turkey, it would significantly undermine the 
PKK’s activities. Moreover, Turkey’s effective financial countermeasures would support 
other military, political, and social countermeasures, and the coordination among these 
measures would certainly end PKK terrorism in Turkey. 
 
211 Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” 55; Ozdemir and Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terror 
Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial Resources of the PKK,” 94–6. 
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